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ABSTRACT
This Article is the first to take a comprehensive look at the issue of
statute-of-limitations accrual in method-of-execution cases. In other
words, when does the clock start ticking on a death row inmate’s right
to challenge the way in which the state intends to execute him? Most
circuit courts have held that method-of-execution challenges accrue at
the completion of the direct appeal process. This means that death
row inmates in these jurisdictions must file method-of-execution
challenges years, and sometimes even decades, before an actual
execution is scheduled. Although this approach has been the subject
of much criticism, even the dissenting view would tie the accrual date
to a particular stage of the death row inmate’s appeals.
This Article examines whether either rule—the majority’s or the
dissenters’—makes sense in light of the nature of method-of-execution
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challenges and the purposes of statutes of limitations. It concludes
that, rather than using the appellate and postconviction process as a
guide in determining when an unrelated challenge to the state’s
method of execution should accrue, courts should treat method-ofexecution claims as the unique tort claims that they are and should tie
accrual to the future constitutional injury that has yet to occur.
The approach proposed in this Article would allow death row
inmates with meritorious claims to have their days in court. And it is
more faithful to the historical purposes of statutes of limitations, more
practical to administer, and no less consistent with the desire
expressed by many courts to preclude dilatory lawsuits.
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INTRODUCTION
Romell Broom is the only death row inmate in the United States
to survive a state’s attempt to execute him by lethal injection. On
September 15, 2009, Ohio prison officials spent more than two hours
trying to access Broom’s veins, puncturing his skin at least eighteen
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1

times. After unsuccessfully attempting to access a vein in Broom’s
2
right ankle (and hitting his bone with the needles in the process), the
Director of the Ohio Department of Corrections halted the execution
3
and called the Governor. The Governor’s decision to postpone the
execution received international attention because it was the first
time an American lethal-injection execution attempt had been
abandoned due to an inability to gain access to the condemned
4
inmate’s veins.
What is less known about Broom’s case is that he had previously
5
filed a § 1983 civil rights lawsuit challenging the way in which Ohio
administered lethal injection, and he had specifically alleged that
6
Ohio executioners were ill-equipped to achieve venous access. He
sought injunctive relief enjoining the state from executing him until,
among other things, the training of the execution team members was
7
sufficient to remove the likelihood of vein-access difficulties. But
Broom never had his day in court. Although he filed his lawsuit more
than two years before the state attempted to execute him, it was
8
dismissed for failing to comply with the statute of limitations. As a

1. Ariane de Vogue, Ohio Execution Fails After 18 Attempts to Puncture Inmate’s Veins,
ABCNEWS.COM (Sept. 18, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/US/convicted-killer-romellbroom-appeals-state-federal-court/story?id=8613608&page=1.
2. Affidavit of Romell Broom at 3, Broom v. Strickland, No. 2:09-cv-00823 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 18, 2009).
3. Governor Strickland Delays Ohio Execution of Romell Broom After Trouble Finding
Suitable Vein, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
2009/09/16/2009-09-16_governor_delays_ohio_execution_after_vein_troubles.html.
4. E.g., Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in
Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783,
862–63 (2010) (“The Broom reprieve was not only unprecedented in Ohio, it was the first time
in the [modern] era that authorities who had ‘botched’ an execution did not persist until they
had succeeded.”); Giles Whittell, Lethal Injection for Killer Romell Broom Delayed After
Botched Execution, TIMES (London), Sept. 16, 2009, at 36.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “gives individuals a civil cause of action against any person who, under
color of state law, deprives them of rights guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution.” Paul
Rathburn, Note, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983: More Than “A Half
Measure of Uniformity,” 73 MINN. L. REV. 85, 85 (1988). Put another way, § 1983 “provides the
statutory authorization for most federal court suits against local governments or state and local
government officials to redress violations of federal civil rights.” Beardslee v. Woodford, 395
F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005).
6. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Attorney Fees, and Costs of Suit Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at 11–12, 17, Broom v. Strickland,
No. 2:04-cv-01156 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2007).
7. Id. at 17.
8. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809, at *5, *7 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 25, 2008).
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result, he was subjected to the same faulty execution procedures that
he had complained about in his lawsuit—and he lived to tell the tale.
When is the right time to object to how you are going to die? For
the thousands of men and women on death row in the United States,
9
this question has taken on “exceptional importance,” but only
recently so. For more than a century, death row inmates have
10
challenged the method by which the state intends to execute them.
Only in the past several years, however, have courts begun to dismiss
many of these challenges on statute-of-limitations grounds. They have
done so by deciding a question that, for most courts, has been one of
first impression: when does the statute of limitations begin to run on a
constitutional violation that has not yet occurred?
Without any real precedent to guide them, and over a number of
vigorous dissents, most federal circuit courts have held that methodof-execution challenges accrue at the completion of the direct appeal
11
process. This means that death row inmates in these jurisdictions
must file method-of-execution challenges years, and sometimes even
decades, before an actual execution is scheduled. Some judges,
writing either in dissent or at the district court level, have argued that
the accrual date should be tied to the inmates’ appeals and
postconviction processes; they would start running the statute of
limitations at the completion of federal habeas corpus proceedings.
This Article explores whether either rule makes sense given the
nature of method-of-execution challenges and the purposes of
statutes of limitations.
The dominant approach to this issue has its roots in a March
2007 decision of the Sixth Circuit. A divided panel of that court, in

9. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey III), 489 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
10. E.g., Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (challenging the gas chamber as a
method of execution); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (challenging electrocution as a
method of execution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (challenging the firing squad as a
method of execution). In Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), a plurality of the Supreme Court
articulated what now appears to be the governing standard for establishing an Eighth
Amendment violation in a method-of-execution challenge. Id. at 1532 (plurality opinion).
Under Baze, the plaintiff must establish “both (1) that the current [execution] procedure poses
‘a substantial risk of serious harm’ and (2) that the state has refused to adopt a ‘feasible, readily
implemented’ alternative ‘significantly’ reducing that risk.” Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the
Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 274 (2009) (quoting Baze,
128 S. Ct. at 1532 (plurality opinion)).
11. See infra Part I.A–B.
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Cooey v. Strickland, was the first to wrestle with the appropriate
accrual date for the statute of limitations in a § 1983 challenge to a
13
method of execution. After considering a number of possible dates,
the Cooey court decided that the most “attractive choice” for an
accrual date was the date upon which the direct appeal process
14
concluded in state court.
This approach consciously mirrors the accrual date found in the
statute of limitations created by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
15
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which governs federal habeas
16
proceedings. The court in Cooey also held that when a state does not
choose lethal injection as a method of execution until after the
defendant’s direct review had concluded, the statute of limitations
begins to run on the date the state adopted lethal injection or the date
17
the state made lethal injection the sole method of execution. But
when it is clear that lethal injection is the governing method of
execution, most death row inmates, under the Cooey approach, must
file constitutional challenges to the execution procedure relatively
soon after their convictions and death sentences are affirmed on
direct appeal.
This Article explores whether there can ever be a functional
accrual date in a method-of-execution challenge and concludes that
there cannot. Such challenges are civil rights actions seeking to enjoin
activity that has not yet occurred—the infliction of pain and suffering
on a condemned inmate. Applying a statute of limitations to such a
lawsuit, filed in advance of the anticipated injury, is not only
conceptually nonsensical but also does little to vindicate the primary
historical purpose of statutes of limitations: protecting defendants
from having to defend against stale claims. A more doctrinally sound
approach, and one that would avoid the counterproductive policy
12. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007). The Cooey line of cases
spans four rulings, two in the Southern District of Ohio and two in the Sixth Circuit. For clarity,
this Article simply refers to Cooey in general, but citations are provided to the appropriate
rulings.
13. Id. at 416–24; see also Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 2007)
(referring to Cooey as “the first and only published decision on when a method-of-execution
claim brought under [§ 1983] accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes”).
14. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 419.
15. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.); Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422 (“[I]t stands to reason that the . . . most appropriate
accrual date should mirror that found in the AEDPA . . . .”).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006).
17. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422.
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implications of Cooey, would be one in which there is no functional
accrual date for method-of-execution challenges. Under such an
approach, inmates seeking to enjoin the use of certain execution
procedures would have to meet the same stringent legal standards
applied in other contexts in which plaintiffs seek injunctions, but
would not have the added burden of overcoming a statute-oflimitations defense. This Article advocates for courts to adopt such an
approach.
Part I examines the current state of the law. In the wake of a pair
of Supreme Court decisions establishing the ability of death row
inmates to file method-of-execution challenges as § 1983 civil rights
18
actions, lower courts have seen a proliferation of such lawsuits. The
states were somewhat slow to latch onto the statute-of-limitations
defense as a mechanism for quick dismissal of these challenges, but it
is now the rare case in which the defense is not raised. The Supreme
Court has never addressed when the statute of limitations accrues on
a method-of-execution challenge, but several circuit courts have now
taken a position. Although Cooey is the seminal case thus far and has
been adopted by other circuits, a number of dissenting circuit judges
and district court judges have taken exception to its reasoning. Most
of these dissenters would set the accrual date at a different step in the
appellate and postconviction process: the conclusion of federal
habeas proceedings.
Part II discusses why it is a mistake for courts to import AEDPA
rules, as well as the motivations behind those rules, when determining
the accrual date for method-of-execution challenges. The Supreme
Court has made clear that § 1983 method-of-execution lawsuits are
19
not challenges to inmates’ convictions or sentences. The concerns
that led to the passage of AEDPA are therefore not implicated in
such lawsuits, and the use of that statute as a guideline arbitrarily
removes the ability of most death row inmates to challenge the means
by which the state will execute them. The selection of any accrual
date that is tied to the appellate or postconviction process, in fact,
divorces the filing rules from the primary purpose of statutes of
20
limitations, which is to provide repose to defendants. Such statutes
18. See sources cited infra note 30.
19. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637,
641–42 (2004). Hill and Nelson are discussed in greater detail later in this Article. See infra text
accompanying notes 27–31, 63–72 & 127–39.
20. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (“[Statutes of limitations] are
statutes of repose; and although affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable
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“represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to
put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of
time and that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
21
prevail over the right to prosecute them.’” Nothing about a methodof-execution claim implicates concerns of staleness, forgetful
witnesses, or missing evidence, however, because the constitutional
tort has not yet taken place.
Part III discusses the way in which most courts to address this
issue have improperly conflated statute-of-limitations and equitable
concerns. Equitable concerns—that death row inmates are filing
lethal-injection challenges merely to forestall their impending
executions—animate most of the recent statute-of-limitations
jurisprudence. Part III explains why equitable concerns should play
no role in a statute-of-limitations analysis. Equity will take care of the
truly dilatory lethal-injection challenges. But when death row inmates
have good reason to have waited to file a lethal-injection challenge—
because, for example, improprieties in the state’s administration of
the protocol only recently came to light—and when they can
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, they should be
permitted to proceed with a constitutional challenge. The approach
taken by most courts so far has not only foreclosed that option, but
has also created an unnecessarily confusing regime that wastes
judicial resources and does little to ensure the finality and certainty
that it was intended to produce.
Finally, Part IV argues that tying the accrual date to any step in
the appeals or postconviction process is a flawed approach. Rather,
the statute of limitations should start running on the date the
unconstitutional execution occurs. Because the condemned inmate
cannot wait that long to file suit, as a practical matter there is no
functional accrual date for a method-of-execution challenge. This
approach makes the most sense doctrinally, and it avoids the arbitrary
and confusing line drawing of the other approaches. It also takes into
account the nature of lethal-injection challenges, which have far more
to do with the record of past executions and the current plans to
administer lethal injection than with the simple availability of a

time to present their claims, they protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with
cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by
death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or
otherwise.”).
21. Id. (quoting R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
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written protocol. In other words, these tend to be fact-bound cases in
which the evidentiary record is continuously developing; they do not
tend to present, for example, abstract questions of statutory
interpretation dependent on a factual record that is static and can be
fixed in time. The approach advocated here protects inmates who
could not have brought their challenges earlier and does nothing to
inhibit the ability of courts to dismiss on equitable grounds challenges
that have been brought solely for the purpose of delay.
Cooey and its progeny are explicitly concerned that death row
inmates—and, by implicit extension, their attorneys—are using
method-of-execution challenges as last-ditch efforts to forestall
22
executions that are otherwise judicially unimpeded. This Article
demonstrates that it is not necessary to distort the doctrine of statute
of limitations, as these courts have done, to ensure that states have
the ability to enforce their death-penalty judgments. Indeed, even if it
were accurate to characterize most method-of-execution challenges as
frivolous lawsuits filed solely for the purposes of delay, that would not
justify distorting the doctrine in a way that precludes meritorious
claims from being heard. And most such claims are not frivolous at
all. Counsel for death row inmates must—and will—file method-ofexecution challenges whenever and however it is ethical to do so and
23
is in their clients’ interests. Many of these claims have been
unsuccessful, but many others have exposed serious problems in the
24
administration of lethal injection in this country. The approach
advocated in this Article permits death row inmates to file objections
to the manner and means by which the state intends to execute them,
so long as they are not filed solely for the purpose of delaying the
execution. It also achieves the stated goals of the courts that are
concerned with dilatory filings but does so without distorting the
statute-of-limitations doctrine.

22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician Participation in Lethal Injection Executions,
88 N.C. L. REV. 11, 66 (2009) (“[L]awyers must continue to vindicate their clients’ rights,
including the Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to an execution procedure that is
likely to involve excruciating pain and suffering.”).
24. See infra notes 29 & 43.
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I. THE STATE OF THE LAW
Death row inmates have been filing method-of-execution
25
challenges for more than a century. But only relatively recently have
26
they used § 1983 as the vehicle for doing so. Once the Supreme
27
28
Court established in Nelson v. Campbell and Hill v. McDonough
that § 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for bringing method-ofexecution challenges, and once litigation in several states began to
29
uncover “numerous flaws in states’ lethal injection procedures,”
30
courts began to see a proliferation of such challenges. As Deborah
Denno has written, “Challenges to lethal injection protocols existed
years before Nelson and Hill, but the Court’s spark of encouragement
[in those cases], no matter how indirect, propelled attorneys to bring
31
claims that may have remained dormant otherwise.”
Because § 1983 was not the preferred method for bringing
32
method-of-execution challenges prior to Hill and Nelson, courts did

25. See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 319, 333–39 (1997) (describing the history of method-of-execution challenges); see also
Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death Penalty in the
United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 792–95 (2008) (discussing various method-ofexecution challenges).
26. See Denno, supra note 25, at 342–43 (noting that death row inmates began filing
method-of-execution challenges as § 1983 cases in the mid-1990s).
27. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004).
28. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006).
29. Berger, supra note 10, at 263–64, 268–72 (discussing various flaws, including that the
procedure “create[s] an unnecessary risk of pain,” that the state “use[s] . . . untrained and
unqualified personnel,” that the architecture of the execution chambers prevents executions
from being carried out in a safe, efficient manner, and that “some states have failed to adopt
consistent, predictable procedures, leading to inconsistent behavior and recordkeeping”).
30. See Note, A New Test for Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal
Injections, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (2007) (referring to an “explosion” of lethal-injection
challenges filed as § 1983 lawsuits following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hill); Liam J.
Montgomery, Note, The Unrealized Promise of Section 1983 Method-of-Execution Challenges,
94 VA. L. REV. 1987, 1989–90 (2008) (noting that, prior to Hill, “[b]ecause courts largely viewed
method-of-execution challenges as [habeas challenges], Section 1983 played little role in capital
post-conviction litigation”); Daniel R. Oldenkamp, Note, Civil Rights in the Execution Chamber:
Why Death Row Inmates’ Section 1983 Claims Demand Reassessment of Legitimate Penological
Objectives, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 955, 988 (2008) (noting that Hill “mobilized death row inmates
nationwide to test the [§ 1983] avenue for relief”).
31. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled
the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 107 (2007) (footnote omitted).
32. Before Hill and Nelson, method-of-execution challenges were typically brought in
habeas petitions. See Montgomery, supra note 30, at 1995–96 (“Before [Nelson] was decided in
2004, it was generally accepted that federal method-of-execution claims were cognizable only
through a habeas corpus petition.”).

ALPER IN FINAL.DOC

874

1/5/2011 5:04:31 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:865

not have occasion to address the statute-of-limitations issue until
§ 1983 lawsuits became more common. Even then, however, states
33
were slow to raise the statute of limitations as a defense. Until the
Sixth Circuit accepted Ohio’s statute-of-limitations defense in Cooey,
the issue was not even litigated in some of the most prominent lethal34
injection cases. Perhaps it had never before occurred to states’
lawyers to raise a statute-of-limitations defense to an action seeking
to enjoin activity that had not yet occurred. In any event, now that
courts have begun to adopt the Cooey approach, states’ lawyers,
seeking to take advantage of an expeditious method of getting cases
35
dismissed, routinely raise the defense in lethal-injection challenges.
Before examining the state of the law with respect to the accrual
issue, it is important to clarify the nature of most § 1983 challenges to
36
state lethal-injection practices. States that employ lethal injection,
with the exceptions of Ohio and Washington, use a three-drug
37
formula to carry out executions. The first drug is intended to
anesthetize the inmate; the second to paralyze him; and the third drug
38
to stop his heart, killing him. Many of the § 1983 lawsuits filed in
recent years on behalf of death row inmates allege that states do not
employ adequate safeguards to ensure that the person being executed
is properly anesthetized before the second and third drugs are

33. For example, the issue was never litigated in Taylor v. Crawford, 445 F.3d 1095 (8th
Cir. 2006), the lethal-injection litigation in Missouri that served as one of the catalysts for
serious questioning of lethal-injection practices around the country. Nooner v. Norris, 491 F.3d
804, 810 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he issue of unjustified delay by the inmate was not raised or
litigated in Taylor.”); see also Berger, supra note 10, at 268–70 (discussing revelations about
lethal-injection practices in Missouri that were discovered during the Taylor litigation).
34. For a history of lethal-injection challenges, see sources cited supra note 25.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 86–97.
36. Although § 1983 can be used to challenge any method of execution, this Article focuses
almost exclusively on challenges to lethal injection, the dominant method of execution in the
vast majority of death penalty states. Denno, supra note 31, at 59. The legal analysis discussed
herein would be similar if not identical in the context of a challenge to another method of
execution, such as electrocution, but this Article uses “method-of-execution challenge” and
“lethal-injection challenge” interchangeably for simplicity’s sake.
37. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63,
97 (2002). Ohio announced in 2009 that it had abandoned the three-drug formula in favor of a
one-drug, anesthetic-only alternative. Ian Urbina, Ohio Is First to Change to One Drug in
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A10. The State of Washington adopted Ohio’s
approach in March 2010. Rachel La Corte, WA Changes Execution Method, ABCNEWS.COM,
Mar. 3, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=9992489.
38. Denno, supra note 37, at 97–98.
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39

administered. Because the second drug in the formula paralyzes the
inmate, the concern is that an inadequately anesthetized person “may
have the sensation of paralysis without anesthesia (known as
awareness) and may feel the burning of the highly concentrated
40
potassium chloride.” If this were to happen, the inmate “could lie
paralyzed, suffocating and experiencing intense burning in his veins,
41
and yet appear peaceful.”
Because there is no dispute that, if implemented properly, the
42
three-drug formula will result in a constitutional execution, the
primary challenges to lethal injection are tied to the implementation
of the protocol and the specific personnel involved rather than to the
43
drugs used in the procedure. As Professor Eric Berger has put it,
“Probably the most serious and complicated problem with many
states’ lethal injection procedures is the use of untrained and
44
unqualified personnel.” Some challenges do implicate the design of
the protocol and the drugs, but for the most part they rely on
evidence of maladministration of those drugs in order to establish a
45
“substantial risk” that the execution will result in an unconstitutional
level of pain to the condemned inmate. The factors that create the
risk—such as inadequate equipment, poor training, and unqualified
execution personnel—are based on aspects of the procedure that are
46
subject to constant revision and are therefore inherently malleable.

39. Berger, supra note 10, at 265; Denno, supra note 31, at 54–58.
40. David Waisel, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC.
1073, 1074 (2007).
41. Berger, supra note 10, at 265; see also Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience:
Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 819 (2008) (“Because
pancuronium paralyzes the inmate during the execution process, the inmate may experience
excruciating pain and suffering but be unable to cry out or even blink an eyelid to let anyone
know if the anesthesia has failed.” (citing Waisel, supra note 40, at 1074)).
42. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978 (N.D. Ca. 2006) (“The parties . . .
agree . . . that assuming effective anesthesia, the use in executions of pancuronium bromide or
potassium chloride as such does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
43. E.g., Alper, supra note 41, at 820 (“Litigation on behalf of death row inmates has
exposed problems at every step of the process, including the mixing of the drugs; the setting of
the IV lines; the administration of the drugs; and the monitoring of their effectiveness.”);
Berger, supra note 10, at 268 (describing some noted deficiencies in the implementation of
lethal injections).
44. Berger, supra note 10, at 268.
45. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (plurality opinion).
46. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1178 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(“Callahan’s § 1983 action is not based on the fact of his death sentence or even on the fact that
he is to be executed by lethal injection. Rather, Callahan is asserting that the specific lethal

ALPER IN FINAL.DOC

876

1/5/2011 5:04:31 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:865

For example, in 2006, a federal judge held that the record before
him was “replete with evidence that in actual practice [California’s
47
written lethal-injection protocol] does not function as intended.”
The state’s “implementation of lethal injection is broken,” he wrote,
48
“but it can be fixed.” In other cases, the states themselves have
emphasized that changes to the personnel and implementation
procedures, even with no accompanying changes to the written
protocol or the drugs used, can seriously affect the plaintiff’s
49
entitlement to relief. More recently, questions have surfaced about
the availability of sodium thiopental, the drug that most states use to
anesthetize the prisoner before paralyzing him and injecting him with
50
deadly potassium chloride. The sole U.S. manufacturer of sodium
thiopental has temporarily stopped production, leaving states
51
scrambling to use stockpiles of the drug before they expire or
acquire the drug from foreign sources not approved by the Food and
52
Drug Administration (FDA). In light of the manufacturing
stoppage, questions abound about the integrity of thiopental used in
53
recent executions and where it was obtained. These questions have
little, if anything, to do with the states’ written lethal-injection

injection protocol presently employed by Alabama is likely to cause him undue pain and
suffering when his execution is carried out.”).
47. Morales, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 979.
48. Id. at 974.
49. For example, in Arizona and Missouri, prison officials changed protocols after issues
arose with doctors who were involved in executions. See, e.g., Alper, supra note 23, at 46–47. In
Missouri, litigation revealed that Dr. Alan Doerhoff, who had been responsible for “virtually all
aspects of executions,” was unqualified and incompetent to perform the executions. Id. at 46.
This was a change in the personnel that was entirely at the states’ discretion, and it had the
potential to fundamentally affect the plaintiffs’ claim for relief.
50. See Kathy Lohr, States Delay Executions Owing to Drug Shortage, NPR (Sept. 16,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129912444 (reporting on delays in
executions due to shortages of sodium thiopental).
51. See Kevin Fagan, Execution: Expiration Date Near for Death Drug,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-09-29/news/24102111_1_sodiumthiopental-pancuronium-bromide-fatal-drugs (“[N]ever before has the state faced a problem
such as the one confronting officials intending to lethally inject a rapist-murderer Thursday—
the expiration, on that same night, of one of the fatal drugs.”).
52. See Amanda Lee Myers & Andrew Welsh-Huggins, State Goes Overseas for Lethal
Injection Drug, YAHOO! NEWS, Oct. 26, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101026/ap_on_re_
us/us_arizona_execution (“Facing a nationwide shortage of a lethal injection drug, Arizona has
taken an unusual step that other death penalty states may soon follow: get their supplies from
another country.”).
53. See Lohr, supra note 50 (noting “concerns about this haphazard method of
implementing the ultimate punishment”).
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protocols, yet they are critical to an understanding of how the states
intend to carry out those protocols.
In short, § 1983 challenges to lethal injection revolve around the
current plans to implement the state’s written protocols. With that in
mind, this Part now turns to the state of the law with respect to when
the statute of limitations begins running on such challenges. Because
§ 1983 cases are generally characterized as constitutional tort claims,
federal courts borrow the length of the state statute of limitations for
54
55
personal injury actions, which is typically one to three years. But
the accrual date—that is, when the statute of limitations begins to
56
run—is a question of federal law. Establishing the accrual date in a
method-of-execution challenge is a matter of first impression in most
jurisdictions. Cooey was the first published decision to address the
accrual date of a method-of-execution challenge. A bit of history is in
order, as this case has set the tone for all courts that have
subsequently examined the issue.
A. Cooey v. Strickland
In 1997, on the eve of his scheduled execution, a Kentucky death
row inmate named Harold McQueen filed a § 1983 civil action in
federal court alleging that the state’s then-used method of
57
execution—electrocution—violated the Eighth Amendment. The
Sixth Circuit faulted McQueen for filing the challenge as a civil
action, characterizing the complaint as “a challenge seeking to
58
interfere with the sentence itself.” As such, the court construed the
complaint as a petition for habeas and dismissed it for failure to
59
comply with the rules for filing such petitions.

54. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (“When Congress has not established a
time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time
limitation as federal law . . . .”); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (“[W]here
state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering
§ 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.”).
55. See Michael B. Brennan, Note, Okure v. Owens: Choosing Among Personal Injury
Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1306, 1324–25 (1988) (discussing how
different circuits have applied different state statutes of limitations).
56. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Defendants have the burden of
demonstrating that the statute of limitations has run. See, e.g., Griffin v. Rogers, 308 F.3d 647,
653 (6th Cir. 2002).
57. McQueen v. Patton (In re Sapp), 118 F.3d 460, 461 (6th Cir. 1997).
58. Id. at 462.
59. Id. at 463.
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Six years later, an Ohio death row inmate named Lewis Williams
filed a similar civil action in federal court challenging Ohio’s lethal60
injection procedures. Relying on the precedent from McQueen’s
case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Williams’s lawsuit on
the grounds that § 1983 was not the appropriate vehicle for
61
challenging a method of execution. Both McQueen and Williams
were executed soon after the Sixth Circuit dismissed their respective
62
cases.
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court decided Nelson v.
Campbell, which held for the first time that § 1983 is an appropriate
63
vehicle for challenging a state’s method of execution. The Court
reasoned that, because the challenge was not to the constitutionality
of the conviction or sentence but rather to the manner and means by
which the state intended to carry out the sentence, the case was more
akin to a prison-conditions lawsuit than a collateral attack on the
64
constitutionality of the trial.
Richard Cooey, another Ohio death row inmate, filed a lethalinjection challenge immediately following the Nelson ruling. Cooey
had been sentenced to death in 1986, and his postconviction appeals
65
were finally denied in March 2003. Cooey filed his lethal-injection
challenge under § 1983, as the Supreme Court had deemed
appropriate just two weeks earlier in Nelson. The state sought to
dismiss Cooey’s lethal-injection challenge—not because it was filed as
a § 1983 case, but because it was filed after the statute of limitations
66
had run. The state argued that the two-year statute of limitations for
constitutional torts accrued either in 1993, when Ohio adopted lethal

60. In re Williams, 359 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 813–14 (citing In re Sapp, 118 F.3d at 464).
62. See Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (providing a database of executions carried out in the
United States). Lewis Williams’s case was dismissed on January 14, 2004, and he was executed
two days later. Harold McQueen was executed on July 1, 1997, just days after the Sixth Circuit
dismissed his appeal on June 27, 1997.
63. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 641–42 (2004).
64. Id. at 645; see also Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (“[Petitioner’s] claim
is more properly considered as a ‘conditions of confinement’ challenge, which is cognizable
under § 1983, than as a challenge that would implicate the legality of his sentence, and thus be
appropriate for federal habeas review.”).
65. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey I), No. 2:04 CV 1156, 2005 WL 5253337, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 28, 2005).
66. Id.
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injection as a method of execution, or in 2001, when lethal injection
67
became the sole method of execution in the state.
The district court rejected the state’s statute-of-limitations
defense, holding that the lethal-injection challenge accrued both
when Cooey’s execution became imminent—that is, when his direct
and postconviction appeals had been exhausted—and when he had
reason to know of the facts that gave rise to his specific method-of68
execution challenge. The district court wrote that requiring a death
row inmate to file a method-of-execution challenge any sooner
“strikes this Court as potentially wasteful and possibly absurd,” given
that he may win relief on appeal or see the execution protocols
69
changed during the lengthy appeals process. The district court also
questioned how Cooey could have been required to file a § 1983
lawsuit prior to Nelson, when circuit precedent squarely held that
70
such lawsuits were improper.
The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court acknowledged that clear
Sixth Circuit precedent had “precluded” a death row inmate from
filing a § 1983 action challenging his method of execution until the
Supreme Court decided Nelson, and it acknowledged that Cooey had
71
filed his lawsuit only weeks after Nelson was decided. Nevertheless,
the court reasoned, Cooey could have filed a § 1983 lawsuit earlier,
anticipating either that the Sixth Circuit would revisit the issue en
banc or that the Supreme Court would overrule circuit precedent.
After all, the court noted, nothing stopped Lewis Williams from filing
a § 1983 lawsuit in Ohio even though the precedent from Harold
72
McQueen’s case six years earlier foreclosed such an avenue of relief.
The Sixth Circuit’s primary justification for rejecting the district
court’s accrual-date test was that it “adds a significant period of delay
to a state’s ability to exercise its sovereign power and to finalize its
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id. at *7.
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id. at *4.
71. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007).
72. Id. As the dissent in Cooey pointed out, Williams’s lawsuit was unsuccessful—his suit
was dismissed, his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied, and he was executed.
Id. at 426 (Gilman, J., dissenting). Holding Williams out as an example for what Cooey should
have done is arguably disingenuous. The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Cooey on this point,
however, was echoed by the Eleventh Circuit in Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th
Cir. 2007). In Grayson, the court held that a death row inmate could have filed a § 1983 lawsuit
challenging lethal injection prior to Hill despite the fact that Eleventh Circuit precedent on
point precluded such a lawsuit. Id.
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73

judgments.” Allowing death row inmates to file method-ofexecution challenges after they have gone through lengthy appeals
and habeas proceedings, the court explained, threatens to frustrate
74
the states’ ability to enforce their laws. The court recalled that
Congress passed AEDPA in response to the same concern and to
“restore and maintain the proper balance between state criminal
75
adjudications and federal collateral proceedings.” Stating that “[a]ll
of the same concerns . . . reflected in . . . AEDPA are relevant here,”
the Sixth Circuit in Cooey chose to borrow AEDPA’s statute-of76
limitations accrual date. Under AEDPA, the one-year statute of
limitations for filing a federal habeas petition begins to run at the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such
77
review. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held that a death row inmate’s
statute of limitations for filing a method-of-execution challenge
78
generally would accrue at that same time.
The only exception to AEDPA’s accrual-date formula, according
to Cooey, would be a situation in which a prisoner did not know what
the method of execution would be when the statute of limitations
79
would otherwise accrue. In that case, the statute of limitations would
accrue when it became clear what that method would be. For
example, Ohio did not adopt lethal injection until 1993 or make it the
80
exclusive method of execution until 2001. One of those dates would
mark the accrual date for Cooey, the court reasoned, because his
direct appeal was completed in 1991. Because his 2004 complaint
would have been filed late under either a 1993 or a 2001 accrual date,
the court did not need to decide which would have been the
73. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 419.
74. See id. at 419 (emphasizing the importance of permitting states to bring finality to the
process).
75. Id. at 420.
76. Id. at 422.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006).
78. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422. It is worth noting that under AEDPA the statute of
limitations is tolled during the pendency of often very lengthy state postconviction proceedings.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”). The Cooey
approach to the statute of limitations in the method-of-execution context includes no such
tolling mechanism, nor does the court seem to have contemplated the possibility of equitable
tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (holding that AEDPA’s statute of
limitations may be tolled for equitable reasons).
79. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 422.
80. Id.
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81

appropriate accrual date. Unable to obtain review of the state’s
lethal-injection procedures, Cooey was executed by lethal injection
82
on October 14, 2008.
In an era in which lawyers for death row inmates are often
83
criticized for filing appeals and claims that are allegedly frivolous, it
is odd that Cooey was faulted for not filing a lawsuit that was
84
precluded by binding circuit precedent. But the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion in Cooey stands for more than just the particularly harsh
application of procedural rules in a death penalty case. After all, now
that Nelson is the law of the land, there is no longer any question that
§ 1983 is the appropriate forum for raising a challenge to a state’s
85
method of execution. Death row inmates, going forward, know how
to file a challenge, so there should be no confusion over whether
§ 1983 or habeas is the appropriate vehicle. But do they know when
to do so? Most courts have followed Cooey’s lead, setting an accrual
date years in advance of the inmate’s execution.
B. Cooey’s Progeny
More than 60 percent of executions since 2000 have taken place
86
in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. It is the states in these
circuits that primarily comprise the modern administration of capital

81. See id. (holding that Cooey’s § 1983 action was barred by the statute of limitations
without noting when the statute began to run).
82. Execution Database, supra note 62.
83. See, e.g., Dorothy Nash Holmes, Habeas Corpus or Hocus Pocus, 8 NEV. LAW. 28, 28
(2000) (criticizing the delay in postconviction litigation); Franco Ordoñez, Death Row Appeal
Challenges Rule Limiting Filings, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17, 2004, at A1 (referring to the
complaint of death penalty supporters that defense attorneys “[tie] up the court system with
frivolous claims”); Jim Vertuno, Few Appeals Follow Execution Ruling, HOUS. CHRON., July 21,
2002, at 43A (“[C]ritics continue to warn about frivolous appeals that would drain time and
money from the court system.”).
84. See, e.g., Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 979 (11th Cir. 2006) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “there would have been little point” to death row inmates bringing a
§ 1983 method-of-execution challenge in the Eleventh Circuit prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hill).
85. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 576 (2006) (reiterating the Nelson rule). It
remains an open question whether method-of-execution challenges must be brought as § 1983
challenges. See, e.g., Duty v. Workman, No. 07-7073, 2010 WL 533117, at *11 (10th Cir. Feb. 12,
2010) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has definitively resolved whether claims
challenging the specific method of execution may never be considered in a habeas
proceeding.”).
86. Execution Database, supra note 62.
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punishment in this country. Not surprisingly, then, it is the courts in
these circuits that have had occasion, in the wake of the increase in
§ 1983 method-of-execution challenges, to rule on the statute-oflimitations accrual-date issue. When they have done so, they have
followed Cooey. Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have, in large
part, adopted Cooey’s approach, as has one other federal court.
88
In McNair v. Allen, an Alabama case, the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that the question of when the statute of limitations
89
accrues in a method-of-execution challenge was novel in that circuit,
presumably because no state in the circuit had ever before raised
statute of limitations as a defense in such a case. Instead, the court
noted, it had traditionally employed an equitable analysis to
determine whether method-of-execution challenges were filed in a
90
timely manner. Now that Alabama had raised the statute of
limitations as a threshold defense, the court was in a position to
address the question of first impression.
Relying in large part on the reasoning of Cooey, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected several possible accrual dates before concluding that
the completion of review on direct appeal will “ordinarily” trigger the
91
statute of limitations in a method-of-execution challenge. When, as
in McNair, the petitioner did not choose his method of execution
under Alabama law until after his direct appeal had been concluded,
the statute of limitations began running on the date that he chose his
92
method of execution. In sum, the standard for determining the
accrual date in the Eleventh Circuit looks very similar to that in

87. Except for Ohio, the states in these circuits are all in the southern United States. See
Franklin E. Zimring, The Wages of Ambivalence: On the Context and Prospects of New York’s
Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 307 (1996) (“The outstanding regional characteristic of
executions in the 1990s is Southern dominance. The consistent tradition of heavy concentration
of executions in the South extends well back into American history.”); Lawrence Kilman, Are
Southern States More Likely to Execute Killers?, GAINESVILLE SUN (Fla.), Jan. 29, 1985, at 8A
(“Studies show the South has a historical tradition of executing more people than the rest of the
country, and some experts say a ‘tradition of retribution’ may also contribute to the execution
rate there.”); Ned Walpin, Why Is Texas #1 in Executions, PBS (Dec. 5, 2000), http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/execution/readings/texas.html.
88. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 1172.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1176.
92. Id. at 1177. When the Alabama legislature changed the state’s preferred method of
execution to lethal injection in 2002, inmates were given thirty days to choose whether they
wanted to die by electrocution or lethal injection. Those that did not make a choice were
deemed to have chosen lethal injection. Id.
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Cooey—in the Eleventh Circuit’s words, “the later of the date on
which state review is complete, or the date on which the capital
litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution
93
protocol.”
94
The Fifth Circuit in Walker v. Epps followed both Cooey and
McNair, holding that the accrual date for a method-of-execution
challenge was “the later of two dates: the date direct review of an
individual case is complete or the date on which the challenged
95
[execution] protocol was adopted.” Likewise, the District Court for
96
the District of Columbia, in Roane v. Holder, held that a method-ofexecution claim accrues “upon completion of the plaintiff’s direct
appeal or, if the challenged protocol is not known upon conclusion of
direct appeal, at the time the plaintiff ‘knew or should have known
based upon reasonable inquiry’ about the protocol giving rise to the
97
challenge.”
In sum, the precedent on this issue is largely uniform. If the
challenged execution protocol exists and is applicable to the death
row inmate, the statute of limitations begins to run when direct
review is completed. If the protocol is not adopted or made available
at that point, or it does not apply to the inmate at the time direct
review is completed, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
protocol is adopted, is made available, and is applicable to the inmate.
C. Dissenting Judges and Jones v. Allen
Uniformity, however, does not preclude controversy. The Cooey
approach has been met by a drumbeat of criticism from dissenting
circuit court judges and district court judges. The critics of Cooey fall
into two camps. Most argue that Cooey sets the accrual date too early;
a minority argues there should be no functional accrual date at all.
Thus far, the dissenting circuit court judges fall into the first
camp. For example, Judge Ronald Gilman, dissenting in Cooey,
agreed with the district court in that case and would have set the
accrual date “at the time when a prisoner’s execution becomes
imminent and the prisoner knows or has reason to know of the facts

93. Id. at 1174. Courts thus far have employed a narrow definition of what it means for a
state to “substantially change” an execution protocol. See infra Part III.B.2.
94. Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2008).
95. Id. at 414.
96. Roane v. Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D.D.C. 2009).
97. Id. at 221 (quoting Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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98

giving rise to his § 1983 claim.” In the context of a challenge to lethal
injection, Judge Gilman would have held that a prisoner knows or has
reason to know of the facts giving rise to his claim “when he learns
99
the details of the protocol that will be used for his execution.” As for
when the execution becomes imminent, Judge Gilman would define
that point as the completion of federal habeas proceedings, which
“have become, for good or for ill, a routine part of carrying out a
100
death sentence in our criminal justice system.” When Cooey went
up for an en banc vote, five other Sixth Circuit judges joined Judge
101
Gilman in dissenting from the court’s denial of rehearing en banc.
In a subsequent Sixth Circuit case that relied on Cooey, several
judges wrote stinging opinions criticizing the Cooey rationale and
citing with approval Judge Gilman’s dissent. Judge Karen Moore
wrote that the court had “fundamentally erred” in its approach to
102
setting the accrual date. Dissenting circuit court judges in other
circuits have also agreed with Judge Gilman’s proposed approach.
For example, Judge Charles Wilson, dissenting from the Eleventh
Circuit’s opinion in McNair, wrote that he found Judge Gilman’s
approach preferable to that of the Cooey majority, “which effectively
requires a death-sentenced prisoner to file a method-of-execution
claim years before his execution is to take place, during which time
103
the challenged protocol could be materially changed.”

98. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 426 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 429.
101. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey III), 489 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The district judge who originally denied the state’s
statute-of-limitations defense in Cooey has noted in subsequent cases (which are confusingly
also captioned Cooey) his continued disagreement with the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in Cooey.
See Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
25, 2008) (“The Court can continue to disagree with the Cooey rationale . . . . But this Court’s
opinion on those issues no longer matters.”).
102. Getsy v. Strickland (Getsy II), 577 F.3d 320, 321 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Getsy v. Strickland (Getsy I), 577 F.3d 309, 316 (6th
Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., concurring) (“I find it unconscionable that by invoking a statute-oflimitations defense, the State should be able to execute a person by a procedure that a court
may ultimately find cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.”).
103. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1178 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting). As
discussed previously, the district court in Cooey also rejected as “potentially wasteful and
possibly absurd” the requirement that a death row inmate file a method-of-execution challenge
years before his actual execution. See supra text accompanying note 69. In 2006, one district
court in Oklahoma dismissed a statute-of-limitations defense in a lethal-injection challenge with
little discussion. In Anderson v. Evans, No. Civ-05-0825-F, 2006 WL 83093, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 11, 2006), the state alleged that the statute of limitations began at the time the plaintiffs
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Alabama District Judge Myron Thompson took a different
104
approach in his critique of the Cooey rationale. In Jones v. Allen,
Judge Thompson focused on the fact that a method-of-execution
challenge is fundamentally different from most § 1983 challenges
because the allegedly unconstitutional act has not yet occurred at the
time the suit is filed; it is the execution itself that may violate the
105
rights of the plaintiffs. In such a case, Judge Thompson held, “it
defies logic, and is contrary to the common law of torts, to conclude
that the statute of limitations has already run on a suit to prevent an
106
unconstitutional act that has not yet occurred.”
Although Judge Thompson’s view on the statute-of-limitations
107
issue was ultimately rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, several
dissenting circuit judges have alluded to it in their critiques of Cooey.
For example, dissenting from the denial of en banc review in Cooey,
Judge Gilman cited Judge Thompson’s critique of the Cooey
majority, saying that it “serves to support my view that the panel
108
opinion in our case was wrongly decided.” Judge Wilson, dissenting
in McNair, wrote that it was “noteworthy” that Judge Thompson had
recognized in Jones that the statute of limitations is, for all intents and
purposes, not even applicable in a case challenging the
109
constitutionality of an event that has not yet occurred. In the Fifth
Circuit, Judge Carolyn King recently noted that, although the statute
of limitations was not squarely before the court and therefore was
unnecessary to resolve in that particular case, “I am content to refer

were sentenced to death. The court disagreed, holding that the statute of limitations accrued, at
the earliest, when the state revealed its execution procedures. Because the lawsuit was timely
filed under that conception of the accrual date, the discussion in Anderson was not extensive. Id.
104. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
105. Id. at 1149.
106. Id. In Jones, the court went on to hold that, although the lawsuit was not precluded by
the statute of limitations, it was filed too late (under equitable principles) to warrant a stay of
execution. Id. at 1154. Because the court’s order had the practical effect of barring Jones’s
lawsuit, Jones appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed Judge Thompson’s stay denial.
Id. Because the State of Alabama did not appeal from the rejection of its statute-of-limitations
argument, Judge Thompson’s opinion on the matter remained good law (and was followed by at
least one other federal district court judge in Alabama) until the Eleventh Circuit decided
McNair. See Grayson v. Allen, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (concurring with
Judge Thompson’s opinion in Jones and adopting it by reference).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93.
108. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey III), 489 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
109. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1179 n.2 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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the reader to Judge Myron Thompson’s thoughtful discussion of this
110
subject” in Jones.
None of these circuit judges, however, went so far as to actually
adopt Judge Thompson’s reasoning and dispense with a functional
accrual date altogether. Judge Wilson, for example, despite favorably
alluding to Judge Thompson’s reasoning, nonetheless concluded that
the best approach to the accrual-date problem was to set the date
after the completion of federal habeas review and when the prisoner
111
has reason to know the details of the execution procedures. The
vast majority of judges to consider the issue, then, would tie the
accrual date to some event in the lengthy process by which a death
row inmate seeks to overturn his conviction and death sentence. Part
II discusses why this approach is misguided. Part III discusses its
counterproductive policy implications. Then Part IV explains why
Judge Thompson’s approach—that the statute of limitations does not
apply when the tort has not yet occurred—is preferable in all regards.
II. FALLING AT THE MARGINS OF HABEAS? INCORPORATION OF
AEDPA RULES AND PRINCIPLES
Appeals from capital convictions and sentences—including
postconviction attacks on those convictions and sentences—have
virtually nothing in common with § 1983 method-of-execution
challenges. The former challenge the fairness of the trial proceedings
in an effort to secure a new trial. The latter do not seek to disturb the
underlying conviction or sentence. Instead, they are civil rights
actions that allege that the procedures the state has in place to
conduct the execution are constitutionally insufficient to protect the
condemned inmate from an unacceptably high risk of serious harm.
Whereas an appeal or habeas petition seeks to vacate the underlying
conviction or death sentence, a § 1983 action seeks only an injunction
prohibiting the execution until the unconstitutional circumstances
have been rectified. Although courts following Cooey have claimed
that method-of-execution challenges “implicate many of the same
112
comity concerns AEDPA was designed to address,” the analogy is
faulty. For this reason—as several of the dissenting judges have

110. Walker v. Epps, 287 F. App’x 371, 379 (5th Cir. 2008).
111. Id. at 1179.
112. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1175; see also Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 421–22
(6th Cir. 2007).
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pointed out—it is fundamentally wrong to look to AEDPA for
113
guidance in the absence of any established accrual date.
Prior to the passage of AEDPA in 1996, there was no statute of
limitations for the filing of a federal petition for writ of habeas
114
corpus. Congress established a statute of limitations in AEDPA to
“reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal
115
sentences, particularly capital cases.”
In particular, Congress
wanted to limit the ability of death row inmates to delay their
executions by filing habeas petitions challenging their state court
116
convictions and sentences. As President Bill Clinton stated when he
signed AEDPA into law, “For too long, and in too many cases,
endless death row appeals have stood in the way of justice being
117
served.” The problem, in the view of AEDPA’s drafters, was that
the late filing of federal habeas petitions initiated necessarily lengthy
review processes that worked to forestall the executions of prisoners
118
sentenced long ago in state court. After all, once a federal habeas
119
petition is filed, it can take years for the case to be resolved.

113. See, e.g., Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 425 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use
of the AEDPA statute-of-limitations accrual date).
114. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 n.1 (2006) (“Until AEDPA took effect in
1996, no statute of limitations applied to habeas petitions.”); see also Brandon Segal, Habeas
Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo
Gateway Standard for Claims of Actual Innocence Fails to Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully
Convicted Americans, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 225, 231 (2008) (“[T]hroughout its history, habeas
corpus was not subject to any statute of limitations or time limit. The [AEDPA], in turn,
represented a distinct milestone and change in direction for the function of habeas.”).
115. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003); see also Jake Sussman, Unlimited
Innocence: Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 343, 358–59 (2001) (referring to AEDPA’s “clearly stated
purpose to reduce delay and induce finality in postconviction collateral attacks”).
116. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–21 (1997) (discussing the Republican Contract with America,
which claimed that “prisoners on death row [could] almost indefinitely delay their punishment”
and sought strict filing deadlines as a result).
117. Presidential Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996).
118. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 381, 400 (1996) (describing the legislative history of AEDPA and the concern regarding
abuse of habeas to delay punishment).
119. One judge on the Ninth Circuit has calculated that, in California, federal habeas
proceedings in capital cases take an average of 6.2 years to be resolved at the district court level.
Arthur L. Alarcon, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 748
(2007). The cases take another several years to make their way through the appellate process.
See id. at 749 (providing the average delays in various appellate stages).
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But it only makes sense to incorporate AEDPA principles in the
§ 1983 method-of-execution challenge context if habeas proceedings
are sufficiently akin to § 1983 suits. Until the Supreme Court decided
Nelson in 2004, it was not clear whether a method-of-execution
challenge was properly the subject of a habeas petition or a § 1983
120
lawsuit; if anything, most attorneys assumed the former. Prior to
Nelson, then, one could argue (and states routinely did) that methodof-execution challenges that were treated as habeas petitions should
121
be subject to the same restrictions as actual habeas petitions.
It is now clear, however, that method-of-execution challenges
brought pursuant to § 1983 are not properly treated as habeas
122
petitions. In Nelson, an Alabama inmate filed a § 1983 lawsuit
shortly before his scheduled execution, alleging that the state’s intent
to use a “cut-down procedure” to establish venous access—an intent
which he had just learned about days earlier—violated his rights
123
under the Eighth Amendment. The state moved to dismiss, arguing
that the § 1983 lawsuit was the “functional equivalent” of a second or
successive habeas petition that should be denied for failure to comply
124
with the stringent requirements necessary to file such petitions. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, so long as a successful § 1983
action would not necessarily invalidate the inmate’s conviction or
death sentence, it did not have to be characterized as a habeas
125
petition. Put another way, only if the § 1983 action threatened to
invalidate the underlying conviction or sentence would it have to
126
comply with the rules governing habeas petitions.

120. See supra note 32.
121. See Berger, supra note 10, at 273 n.68 (explaining that, prior to Nelson and Hill, “some
lower courts had dismissed lethal injection claims by treating them as ‘successive’ habeas
petitions, even though they had been filed as § 1983 actions”).
122. It remains unsettled whether method-of-execution challenges must be filed as § 1983
lawsuits as opposed to incorporated within habeas petitions. See supra note 85.
123. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 641–42 (2004). According to Alabama prison
officials, the plan was to “make a 2-inch incision in petitioner’s arm or leg” using only local
anesthesia. Id. at 641. “There was no assurance that a physician would perform or even be
present for the procedure.” Id.
124. Id. at 642.
125. Id. at 646–47.
126. For example, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the plaintiff sought to recover
damages under § 1983 for an allegedly unconstitutional arrest and conviction. Id. at 479. The
Supreme Court held that under those circumstances, the plaintiff must establish that the
conviction or sentence has been legally invalidated. Id. at 486–87. If not, the claim for damages
is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. Accordingly, “when a state prisoner seeks damages in
a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
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Just two years after Nelson, the Court took up the issue again in
Hill v. McDonough and reaffirmed the principle it had articulated in
Nelson. As opposed to the “cut-down” procedure challenged in
Nelson, the petitioner in Hill was challenging the three-drug lethal127
injection formula Florida intended to use to execute him.
Otherwise, the issues were quite similar, and the Court made quick
work of the state’s attempt to convince the Court to water down or
overrule outright its decision in Nelson. Instead, the Court
unanimously reiterated that method-of-execution challenges, so long
as they do not seek to overturn the underlying conviction or sentence,
may properly be filed as § 1983 lawsuits rather than habeas
128
petitions.
If, as Nelson and Hill demonstrate, a method-of-execution
challenge is an altogether separate matter from a collateral challenge
to a conviction or death sentence, one may legitimately question why
the statute-of-limitations accrual dates should mirror each other.
After all, one significant difference between a habeas claim and a
§ 1983 challenge is that the former, if timely filed, must go through a
lengthy review process that can take more than a decade to
129
complete, whereas a timely filed but dilatory § 1983 lawsuit will be
dismissed almost immediately if the prisoner cannot win a stay of
130
execution.
Moreover, although Cooey and its progeny tend to state in
conclusory fashion that the concerns that animated AEDPA are
relevant in the method-of-execution context, none of these cases
actually explores whether the parallel holds up. Cooey itself, for
example, stated that “[a]ll of the same concerns” are relevant in the
method-of-execution context but explained this statement only by
saying that, “[l]ike federal habeas actions, a § 1983 method of

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. But “if the district court
determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of
any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to
proceed.” Id.
127. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 581 (2006).
128. Id.
129. See supra note 119.
130. When a court determines that a method-of-execution challenge has been filed for the
purpose of delay, it will deny a stay of execution, and the litigation will typically be unable to
proceed. See infra text accompanying notes 160–67.
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execution challenge ‘implicates values beyond the concerns of the
131
parties.’”
It is true that both method-of-execution challenges and habeas
petitions are filed by death row inmates and have the potential to
delay scheduled execution dates. But the analogy to AEDPA
employed by Cooey and its progeny appears to be based on nothing
more than that fact. Some courts’ liberal use of one line from the
Supreme Court’s Nelson opinion is illustrative of the thin reed
supporting the comparison.
In Nelson, the Court stated that method-of-execution challenges
132
“fall at the margins of habeas.” On its face, and devoid of context,
such a statement could mean a number of things. One interpretation
could be that § 1983 challenges are not identical to habeas actions but
are similar enough to be considered habeas actions “at the margins,”
and perhaps for statute-of-limitations purposes. The Sixth Circuit in
Cooey and the Eleventh Circuit in Jones both employed this
interpretation. Cooey noted that the concerns that led to the passage
of AEDPA “apply with equal force” in a lethal-injection challenge
133
because such challenges “fall at the margins of habeas.” Likewise,
McNair quoted Nelson’s “margins of habeas” language and concluded
that method-of-execution challenges therefore “implicate many of the
134
same comity concerns AEDPA was designed to address.”
But the line from Nelson supports no such conclusion. The full
context of the quote is as follows:
We note that our holding here is consistent with our approach to
civil rights damages actions, which, like method-of-execution
challenges, fall at the margins of habeas. Although damages are not
an available habeas remedy, we have previously concluded that a
§ 1983 suit for damages that would “necessarily imply” the invalidity
of the fact of an inmate’s conviction, or “necessarily imply” the
invalidity of the length of an inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable
under § 1983 unless and until the inmate obtains favorable
termination of a state, or federal habeas, challenge to his conviction
135
or sentence.

131. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Acosta v.
Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000)).
132. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004).
133. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 421 (citing Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646).
134. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646).
135. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646.
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In other words, a § 1983 suit is not like a habeas petition, unless its
success would necessarily undermine the underlying conviction and
sentence. Some civil rights suits seeking damages—such as when a
136
prisoner seeks damages for an unlawful arrest —implicate habeas
relief because a successful suit necessarily implies the invalidity of the
prisoner’s sentence. In Nelson, however, the Court went on to make
clear that the method-of-execution challenge at issue in that case was
137
not such a lawsuit. As a result, the § 1983 challenge could not be re138
characterized as a habeas petition. The Court reiterated this precise
point in Hill. The lethal-injection lawsuits at issue in Nelson and Hill,
the Court explained, “did not challenge an execution procedure
required by law, so granting relief would not imply the unlawfulness
139
of the lethal injection sentence.”
Thus, the extent of the analogy appears to be that both federal
habeas petitions and method-of-execution challenges have the
potential to delay the executions of death row inmates. Because
AEDPA was intended to cut down on such delays, the theory seems
to go, why not use the same statute of limitations for method-ofexecution challenges? Perhaps this approach has surface appeal, to
the extent it is desirable to have some symmetry in one procedural
aspect of two different kinds of legal actions initiated by death row
inmates. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the selection of
an accrual date based on a loose analogy to a statute governing a
140
different kind of proceeding is simply arbitrary.
136. See supra note 126.
137. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 646.
138. See id.
139. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 588 (2006); see also Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II),
479 F.3d 412, 425 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (“[A] § 1983 action is not an attack on
the validity of the death-sentenced inmate’s conviction or sentence.”). Interestingly, the district
judge in Cooey who originally rejected the state’s statute-of-limitations defense referred to the
Sixth Circuit’s comment about method-of-execution challenges falling “at the margins of
habeas” as “unfortunate.” Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809,
at *4 n.3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2008). The court did so, however, in the context of rejecting a
death row inmate’s claim that certain favorable federal habeas case law applied to his lethalinjection challenge. The Sixth Circuit’s use of the “margins of habeas” language was not, the
court noted, “a blanket invitation to conflate habeas principles at will.” Id.
140. One Sixth Circuit judge described the use of habeas rules to bar § 1983 civil rights suits
as follows: “[Cooey’s] ill-advised rule unduly entangles a prisoner’s challenges to the validity of
his or her sentence with the wholly distinct question of whether the method by which he or she
will be executed—assuming the Court ultimately denies habeas relief—can withstand
constitutional scrutiny.” Getsy v. Strickland (Getsy I), 577 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore,
J., concurring). Indeed, the twin keystones of modern habeas jurisprudence—comity with the
states and finality—have little application here. Finality is not an issue because courts’ broad
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The reasoning supplied by Cooey and its progeny does not dispel
the concern that the choice of accrual date is arbitrary. Cooey pointed
out that a tort claim generally accrues when the plaintiff “can file suit
141
and obtain relief,” and reasoned that a death row inmate can do so
142
after his conviction has become final on direct review. For the
reasons discussed in Part III.B, it is not at all clear that a death row
inmate can actually obtain relief on a method-of-execution challenge
filed years before his scheduled execution. In many cases, such a
lawsuit would likely be dismissed as unripe, or perhaps as lacking
143
standing. But if one does assume that a death row inmate could file
a method-of-execution challenge and obtain relief following direct
appeal, one would also have to assume that he could file suit the day
after his death sentence is imposed. Why should he have to wait until
his direct appeal is complete?
This question was not addressed in Cooey, but the Eleventh
Circuit in McNair answered it sua sponte. “[B]y requiring a defendant
to wait to bring a claim [until] after direct review is complete (as
opposed, say, to when the sentence is first imposed),” the McNair
court noted, “we ensure claims are not brought prematurely, before
the state courts have had an adequate opportunity to correct any
144
infirmities in the defendant’s conviction or sentence.”
This
reasoning does not withstand scrutiny.
First, it is not true that setting the accrual date after direct appeal
precludes a suit from being filed prior to that date. As discussed in
145
Part IV, a claim can be ripe before it accrues. More fundamentally,
however, the selection of direct appeal as the point at which one can
be sure that there has been an adequate opportunity to review the
constitutionality of inmates’ trials is simply one such spot along the
timeline of the appeals process. Why not at the conclusion of state
postconviction proceedings, when the state courts have had the
opportunity to review the extra-record evidence, such as claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, that so often form the basis of

equitable power guards against the use of method-of-execution challenges as vehicles for delay.
See infra text accompanying notes 162–71. And comity also need not apply because there has
been no state court adjudication.
141. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 416 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)).
142. Id. at 419.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 198–200.
144. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1176 (11th Cir. 2008).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 253–55.

ALPER IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

1/5/2011 5:04:31 PM

BLIND DATES

893
146

constitutional challenges to death row inmates’ trials? Why not, as
the dissenting circuit judges have suggested, at the conclusion of
federal habeas review, when the federal courts have had the
147
opportunity to review the state court convictions? After all, as many
as 40 percent of capital cases get overturned in federal habeas
148
proceedings “due to serious error.”
If courts are genuinely
concerned with discouraging lethal-injection challenges until the
constitutional infirmities have been rooted out of capital trials,
waiting until federal habeas review is complete would appear to be
149
the most rational approach.
None of these choices, however, have anything to do with the
purposes of statutes of limitations. Therein lies the fallacy of tying the
accrual date to a step in the appeals and postconviction process. The
primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to provide repose to
150
defendants, protecting them from having to litigate “stale claims.”
The idea is to ensure “essential fairness to defendants and . . . [bar] a
151
plaintiff who has ‘slept on his rights.’” More specifically, the
Supreme Court has explained that statutes of limitations “are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the

146. See Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death
Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990) (discussing “manifold colorable claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel” that typically comprise most postconviction proceedings).
147. See, e.g., McNair, 515 F.3d at 1179 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a better
approach is to fix the date of accrual when the defendant’s habeas challenge is exhausted);
Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 428–29 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting)
(“This accrual date provides clarity and certainty to both the death-sentenced inmate and the
State that the sentence is final and not susceptible to attack, that the execution date is set, and
that the protocol for that execution is likely fixed.”).
148. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition:
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1849 (2000).
149. It may be suggested that placing the accrual date at the conclusion of direct review
accounts for the fact that the state can technically initiate execution proceedings at that point,
and it cannot do so until that point. But a death-sentenced inmate’s ability to file a method-ofexecution challenge is not necessarily related to the state’s technical ability to initiate execution
proceedings. In fact, capitally charged defendants occasionally challenge the method of
execution in pretrial litigation. One such challenge in Ohio was successful. See State v. Rivera,
No. 04-CR-065940 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008) (ordering that “if defendants herein are
convicted and sentenced to death by lethal injection, that the protocol employ the use of a lethal
injection of a single, anesthetic drug”). In any event, there is no evidence that any state in the
modern death-penalty era has made a serious attempt to execute an inmate immediately upon
the conclusion of direct review.
150. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 15 (2000); see also infra text accompanying
notes 194–98.
151. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (quoting Burnett v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)).
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revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has
152
been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”
Such concerns are nonexistent in the method-of-execution
context. When the tort has yet to take place, there can be no concern
about staleness. Method-of-execution challenges—and particularly
lethal-injection challenges—are about the prison officials’ present
intentions with respect to the administration of their execution
153
procedures. By definition, the evidence cannot be lost and the
claims cannot be stale because the litigation seeks to stop a process
that the state intends to carry out in the future. In this way, challenges
to lethal injection are akin to other requests for injunctive relief
seeking to stop a proposed action from occurring, such as the
154
chopping down of a sacred tree, in which the statute of limitations
never even enters the picture. Or perhaps they are like continuingviolation cases, in which “conduct which repeats itself or that is
continuing in nature is subject to ready investigation and
confirmation and does not present the staleness problems that
155
statutes of limitations are primarily designed to prevent.” One of
the reasons that the courts addressing this issue in the lethal-injection
context have found themselves with so little precedent to guide them
is that defendants do not typically raise the statute of limitations as a
defense to actions seeking injunctive relief.

152. R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944); see also James
R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the
Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 590–92
(1996) (discussing various policies that statutes of limitations are designed to promote).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
154. See Richard Brenneman, Tree-Sitters Get a Day in Court, Cal Bears to Move to Interim
Venue, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET, Nov. 20, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.berkeley
dailyplanet.com/issue/2008-11-20/article/31626?headline=Tree-Sitters-Get-a-Day-in-Court-CalBears-to-Move-to-Interim-Venue (discussing a lawsuit filed to enjoin the cutting down of a
grove of trees on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley). Indeed, one might
legitimately question whether the statute of limitations can even be raised in a suit seeking
solely injunctive—that is, equitable—relief. As several of the cases following Cooey have
pointed out, however, the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), appears to
have held that statutes of limitations apply to all § 1983 cases (although Wilson itself was a
damages case). Id. at 275–76; see also McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citing Wilson to justify the application of the statute of limitations); Chester v. Beard, 657 F.
Supp. 2d 534, 539–40 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (discussing whether Wilson stands for the proposition that
the statute of limitations applies to § 1983 cases seeking solely injunctive relief).
155. MacAyeal, supra note 152, at 616–17. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982), the Supreme Court applied the continuing-violation doctrine to the statute of limitations
in the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006). Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S.
at 380 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a)).
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Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit in Cooey applied the statute of
limitations and selected completion of direct review as an “attractive
choice” for accrual. It did not do so, however, to vindicate the
principles of statutes of limitations, but rather to “mark[] the point at
which the state has rendered its criminal judgment final and, absent
collateral civil proceedings, the point at which the state sets the
156
execution date.” For reasons already discussed, it makes little sense
to so casually dismiss the “collateral civil proceedings” that are an
integral part of virtually every death penalty case and that can take
157
more than a decade to complete. It is far more realistic to give death
row inmates the practical ability to file a method-of-execution
challenge closer to their impending execution. For that reason,
starting the statute of limitations at the end of federal habeas review,
as the dissenting circuit court judges would have it, makes more
practical sense than requiring prisoners to file claims years, and even
decades, before their executions.
As a doctrinal matter, however, it is no less arbitrary to choose
the end of habeas review as the accrual date than it is to choose an
158
earlier point. Neither is tied to the purposes of statutes of
limitations. As Judge Thompson put it in Jones, “There is no rhyme
or reason in choosing among these options precisely because they are
little more than stand-ins for the actual tortious event the court would
159
otherwise look for in a run-of-the-mill § 1983 case.”
Not only is it arbitrary to select any date, let alone one as early in
the process as the completion of direct review, but it is also
unnecessary. To the extent courts have adopted the AEDPA statute
of limitations to reduce delays or impede the ability of death row
inmates to game the system and forestall their executions, there is a
simple alternative mechanism available—denying a request to stay an
execution.
156. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 419 (6th Cir. 2007).
157. See supra text accompanying note 103.
158. Imagine, for example, a death row inmate who files a § 1983 lawsuit alleging that
dangerous conditions in the prison have risen to the level of a constitutional violation and seeks
an injunction to improve those conditions. The defendant prison officials in that hypothetical
case could never credibly allege that the statute of limitations on such a challenge should be tied
to the date on which the plaintiff inmate completed his direct appeals (or his federal habeas
proceedings, for that matter). Because the constitutional violation alleged has nothing to do
with the underlying conviction and sentence for which the plaintiff is on death row, the statuteof-limitations accrual date would be similarly unrelated. In fact, as a matter of practice, the
statute of limitations is never invoked by defendant prison officials in such cases.
159. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
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III. UNNECESSARY CONFLATION OF STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS
AND EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
When a death row inmate files a § 1983 lawsuit challenging a
state’s method of execution, an execution date may or may not have
already been set. As long as no execution date has been set, there is
no need for the inmate to request a stay of execution. But if a date
has been set prior to the lawsuit, or if it is set during the pendency of
the lawsuit, the inmate will typically need to request a stay from the
court to complete the § 1983 litigation before his impending execution
160
renders the proceedings moot.
Courts presented with stay-of-execution requests have familiar
principles to guide them, as they typically look to the criteria
necessary to grant a preliminary injunction: a strong likelihood of
success on the merits, the possibility of irreparable injury to the
plaintiff, a balance of the hardships favoring the plaintiff, and the
161
advancement of the public interest. With respect to stays of
execution in particular, the Supreme Court has explained that states
have a “strong interest in enforcing [their] criminal judgments
162
without undue interference from the federal courts” and has
established a “strong equitable presumption against the grant of a
stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow
163
consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.” In
other words, if the § 1983 lawsuit is not filed in time to run its course
before the execution date, but it could have been, courts typically will
not grant a stay. The § 1983 litigation can proceed, but it can also be
164
mooted by the plaintiff’s execution.

160. See Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter, But Can It Be Fixed? A Look at Constitutional
Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 445, 464–65 (2007)
(describing stay litigation in the context of a § 1983 method-of-execution challenge).
161. Id. at 464 n.110 (citing Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430
(9th Cir. 1995)).
162. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).
163. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004).
164. See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 160, at 465 (“[E]ven though a § 1983 claim
requires a plaintiff only to prove the constitutional challenge by a preponderance of the
evidence, if an inmate does not make a greater showing, the execution stay will not be granted.
The execution takes place before a hearing can be held on the constitutional issue.”). This is
precisely what happened in Hill and in Jones. See infra text accompanying notes 169–71. In both
cases, the petitioner’s § 1983 action would have been allowed to proceed but for the fact that,
according to the court, the equities did not favor the granting of the stay that would be
necessary to actually litigate the case.
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The most successful § 1983 challenges to lethal injection have
165
taken many months to litigate. As a result, depending on the
circumstances, it may not be prudent for a death row inmate to wait
until the completion of federal habeas review to file a method-ofexecution challenge. In many states, the completion of that review
triggers the setting of an execution date, sometimes within months or
166
even weeks. An inmate who files a § 1983 suit on the day the
Supreme Court denies review of his habeas petition may well need to
request a stay of execution to litigate his civil case. If he had the
information necessary to file the claim sooner, the district court may
167
deny the stay request for equitable reasons.
All of this raises the question: why is the statute-of-limitations
defense necessary to ward off dilatory method-of-execution
challenges? If a death row inmate waits too long to file a § 1983
challenge, such that a court can say that he could have brought it in
time to “allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a
168
stay,” the court will deny the stay, and there likely will not be time
to litigate the method-of-execution challenge. If the claim could not
have been filed any earlier, then the court will grant the stay, and the
plaintiff will be able to litigate his case without fear of his execution
mooting the case. This latter scenario should not be the subject of any
concern, however, because, by definition, if the court grants a stay,
there has been no undue delay on the part of the plaintiff. If there is
no dilatory filing, and thus no attempt to abuse the legal process to
stave off an execution, the concerns animating the AEDPA statute of
limitations simply do not apply.
A. Rejection of the “Veto Power” Myth
The Cooey approach suffers from a fundamental flaw: the
conflation of statute-of-limitations and equitable principles. What
makes the conflation of these principles puzzling is that the Supreme
Court could not have been clearer in both Nelson and Hill that
165. See Denno, supra note 31, at 107–16 (providing a lengthy history of the most successful
modern method-of-execution challenges).
166. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing the
practice in Alabama of setting execution dates soon after the Supreme Court denies review in
federal habeas).
167. See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 160, at 465–67 (discussing the “strong equitable
presumption” that courts frequently apply in refusing to grant a stay when a claim could have
been brought earlier).
168. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 650.
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equitable considerations are available and sufficient to protect the
state from dilatory lawsuits. In Nelson, the Court said, “[T]he mere
fact that an inmate states a cognizable § 1983 claim does not warrant
169
the entry of a stay as a matter of right.” In Hill, the Court said,
“Filing an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle the
170
complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course.”
In fact, although the Supreme Court ruled in his favor, Clarence Hill
was ultimately executed because the lower federal courts refused to
171
grant him a stay of execution following the Court’s ruling.
Judge Thompson was well aware of the distinction between the
statute-of-limitations and the equitable considerations available to
him. In Jones, the court rejected the state’s statute-of-limitations
172
defense. But, because the lawsuit was filed while an execution date
was pending, the court necessarily went on to consider whether to
grant a stay. Judge Thompson reviewed the history of the case and
concluded that, although Jones filed his § 1983 lawsuit within the
statute of limitations, he could have filed it sufficiently earlier such
173
that he would not have had to seek a stay of execution at all. As a
174
result, citing Hill and Nelson, the court denied the stay. But that
inquiry was entirely separate from the inquiry about the statute-oflimitations accrual date. In fact, the § 1983 lawsuit technically
survived Judge Thompson’s ruling; the court explicitly noted that if
Jones were able to obtain a stay of his execution on some other
grounds, “the instant § 1983 litigation [would] proceed as
175
scheduled.” Jones did not receive any other stay, and he was
176
executed on May 3, 2007. His challenge to lethal injection was never
heard in the federal courts because he filed the lawsuit too late—not
too late under the statute of limitations, but too late to obtain a stay
of his execution.
Jones demonstrates the ease with which the two concepts can be
doctrinally separated. Yet the Cooey line of cases is riddled with
equitable concerns masquerading as statute-of-limitations doctrine.
169. Id. at 649.
170. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 583–84 (2006).
171. See Denno, supra note 31, at 113 (“While Hill emerged successful from the Supreme
Court, the victory proved to be of little use to Hill himself.”).
172. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
173. Id. at 1151–53.
174. Id. at 1154.
175. Id.
176. Execution Database, supra note 62.
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The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in McNair is illustrative. In the course
of adopting the Cooey rationale, the McNair court rejected the
approach suggested by Judge Gilman, dissenting in Cooey, which
would have set the accrual date at the completion of federal habeas
review. The court stated, “Were we to hold a § 1983 method of
execution challenge accrues on the date federal habeas review ends,
we would effectively provide capital defendants with a veto power
over the state’s ability to effectuate its judgment at the close of
177
federal habeas review.” The McNair court’s concern echoed that
raised in Cooey: “[S]etting an accrual date at the point of . . .
exhaustion of federal collateral remedies adds a significant period of
delay to a state’s ability to exercise its sovereign power and to finalize
178
its judgments.”
The concern in McNair and Cooey that setting the accrual date at
the completion of federal habeas review would give inmates “veto
power” over their executions is entirely unfounded. As the Jones case
illustrates, nothing precludes a judge from denying a stay of execution
to an inmate whom the court concludes has waited too long to bring
179
suit. In fact, it happens all the time. A death row inmate would only
be able to frustrate the state’s attempt to “effectuate its judgment at
180
the close of federal habeas review” if he were able to file a lawsuit
that had a likelihood of success on the merits and was based on
sufficiently recent discovery or information such that the court would
find it could not have been filed earlier. In that case, presumably, the
inmate’s “veto power” would be warranted. In all other cases, the
inmate would have no such power because of the courts’ frequently
exercised equitable authority to deny requested stays of execution.
B. Dangers of an Unnecessarily Early Accrual Date
One might conclude that the conflation of statute of limitations
and equitable concerns, although doctrinally imprecise, works no
undue disadvantage to a death row inmate. After all, if a prisoner sat
on his rights and filed a method-of-execution challenge too late, one
might think there is little concern in holding that the lawsuit is barred
by the statute of limitations. And that may be true in many cases;
there is no conceptual problem with the notion that frivolous § 1983
177.
178.
179.
180.

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (11th Cir. 2008).
Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 419 (6th Cir. 2007).
See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 160, at 465.
McNair, 515 F.3d at 1176.
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method-of-execution challenges cannot be used simply to delay an
otherwise lawful execution. The problem lies in those cases in which a
petitioner did not unduly delay the filing of a method-of-execution
challenge but did file the lawsuit many years after his direct appeals
concluded, when, for example, recent information casts doubt upon
the reliability of the procedures the state intends to implement. Such
a case would be precluded by the Cooey approach, but there is no
principled reason why that should be.
181
Recall the case of Ohio death row inmate Romell Broom.
Broom’s case is infamous, as it is the only time in U.S. history that a
lethal-injection execution has been cancelled because prison officials
182
could not carry out the process.
Well before his execution, however, Broom and his counsel were
aware that Ohio prison officials had a troubling record when it came
to accessing inmates’ veins during executions. Joseph Clark’s
execution in May 2006 lasted almost ninety minutes, during which
183
time prison officials tried and initially failed to access Clark’s veins.
At one point, Clark raised his head off the gurney and said, “It’s not
184
working.” Later in the execution, Clark asked, “Can you just give
185
me something by mouth to end this?” After more struggling to set a
new intravenous line, the execution continued and Clark was finally
186
pronounced dead. Following the Clark execution, and in light of the

181. See supra text accompanying notes 1–8.
182. Bob Driehaus, Ohio Plans to Try Again as Execution Goes Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2009, at A16 (“This is the first time an execution by lethal injection in the United States has
failed and then been rescheduled.”); see also Pete Krouse, Gov. Ted Strickland Orders a
Temporary Halt to the Planned Execution of Romell Broom, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept.
15, 2009, at A1 (referring to Broom’s halted execution as “unprecedented”).
183. Adam Liptak, Trouble Finding Inmate’s Veins Slows Lethal Injection in Ohio, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2006, at A16.
184. Id.
185. Jim Provance, Ohio Designs Single-Drug Execution, THE BLADE (Toledo), Nov. 14,
2009,
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091114/NEWS24/911140361
(“Following similar problems in the 2006 execution of Joseph Lewis Clark, formerly of Toledo,
the state made minor changes but decided to retain the three-drug process.”).
186. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Botched Execution Leads to Ohio Review, WASH. POST, May
12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/11/AR2006051101618.
html (“The team then attached a shunt to Clark’s other arm but apparently tried to administer
the lethal drugs through the first shunt by mistake . . . . Clark . . . was executed after officials
switched the drugs to the proper line.”); see also Lloyd de Vries, Ohio Execution Problems Raise
Qualms, CBSNEWS.COM, May 3, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/03/national/
main1576011.shtml (“The execution team . . . worked for about 25 minutes to find a vein in
Clark’s right arm before continuing with just the shunt in his left arm.”).
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difficulties the execution team had in carrying out their tasks, Ohio
187
prison officials convened to revise their lethal-injection protocol.
188
Broom filed a § 1983 complaint on April 25, 2007, more than
two years before the state actually attempted to execute him.
Referencing Clark’s botched execution, Broom alleged that Ohio
prison officials had failed to include in their most recent lethalinjection protocols “a requirement that the personnel assigned to
establish and maintain the intravenous (IV) lines are properly
189
trained.” Broom went on to complain that Ohio officials had failed
to account for the “real possibility . . . that IV access to Plaintiff’s
190
veins cannot be successfully established or maintained.”
Nevertheless, on August 25, 2008, the district court, bound by Cooey,
dismissed Broom’s complaint for failure to comply with the statute of
191
limitations.
Unable to litigate his challenge to Ohio’s lethal-injection
procedures, Broom was ultimately subjected to those procedures,
suffering a botched execution attempt that elicited worldwide scorn
and was the impetus for Ohio’s decision to abandon the three-drug
192
lethal-injection formula altogether.
What went wrong in his
execution was exactly what he had filed a lawsuit to prevent—the
inability of prison officials to access his veins.
Broom filed his complaint well before his scheduled execution.
He did not, and did not need to, seek a stay of his execution to litigate
his case; the state did not even set an execution date until two years
after Broom filed his lawsuit. Thus, none of the concerns that

187. See Reginald Fields, Ohio Changes the Procedure for Lethal Injection of Inmates,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 13, 2009, at A1 (“[W]holesale changes come on the heels of
an embarrassing, botched attempt to execute [Broom] . . . .”).
188. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Attorney Fees, and Costs of Suit Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, supra note 6, at 21.
189. Id. at 11.
190. Id.
191. See Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey IV), No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2008 WL 4065809, at *7 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 25, 2008) (“Cooey is controlling precedent with a dispositive rationale that the
undersigned must fully recognize, credit, and apply. . . . For the foregoing reasons, this Court
[grants] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.”). In the meantime, Ohio officials had struggled to
achieve venous access during another execution, that of Christopher Newton in May 2007.
Newton’s execution lasted so long—more than two hours—that he was given a bathroom break
in the middle of it. Scott Conroy, Bizarre Execution in Ohio, CBSNEWS.COM, May 24, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/24/national/main2848395.shtml.
192. See Urbina, supra note 37 (“Ohio’s decision came in response to the failed . . .
execution of Romell Broom . . . .”). As of this writing, Ohio has not made a second attempt to
execute Broom.
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animated AEDPA and that would be relevant to an equitable
determination of dilatoriness were at issue. Broom was simply denied
his day in court because he did not file his claim within two years of
the state’s adoption of lethal injection as a method of execution, a
point in time that had nothing to do with his actual ability to file suit
to enjoin the specific procedures Ohio intended to use to execute
193
him. Had Broom been able to litigate his case, perhaps he would
have been able to prevent the constitutional violation before it
occurred, which is exactly what his suit was designed to do.
As Broom’s case demonstrates, the exception contained within
the Cooey approach—that the statute-of-limitations clock starts over
194
when the written protocol is substantially changed —is too narrow to
be meaningful. The facts giving rise to Eighth Amendment challenges
have far less to do with the written protocol than they do with the
present ability of state officials to implement the written protocol in a
195
reliable and humane manner.
One might argue that statutes of limitations will always preclude
some meritorious claims, and one should not be concerned with
plaintiffs who may suffer constitutional injury but do not initiate their
lawsuits early enough. As the Supreme Court has said,
The theory [of statutes of limitations] is that even if one has a just
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within
the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in
196
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.

Under the Cooey approach that was applied to Broom’s case,
however, Broom had to have filed a lawsuit in 2003, before Ohio’s

193. As my colleague Elisabeth Semel has put it, the Cooey decision “effectively insulated
Ohio from any accountability for its method of execution.” Semel, supra note 4, at 859.
194. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We hold a method of
execution claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date
on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution
protocol.”).
195. One might suggest, then, that an answer to the accrual problem would be to simply
expand the understanding of which circumstances would warrant resetting the statute-oflimitations clock. It is true that some of the unfairness inherent in setting the accrual date so
early would be mitigated if the clock restarted whenever new facts came to light—such as a
recently botched execution, or the unavailability of recently manufactured drugs. The practical
results may even be quite similar to those under the no-accrual-date approach advocated in Part
IV. The problem with this solution to the accrual-date problem, however, is that it still suffers
from the doctrinal confusion between ripeness and accrual that pervades Cooey and its progeny.
See infra Part IV.
196. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
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197

high-profile botched executions and before the extent of the
problems associated with Ohio’s procedures were known to anyone.
Nothing underlying the theory of statutes of limitations suggests
courts should penalize plaintiffs who do not file lawsuits until they
have adjudicable claims.
The early accrual approach of Cooey is not just ill-advised—
because it threatens to subject death row inmates to torturous
executions (or execution attempts) without affording them a
meaningful opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims in
court—the approach also has a number of practical flaws that render
it unworkable and unsustainable in the long run.
1. Forcing Unripe Claims. The practical ability of death row
inmates to challenge their method of execution years in advance is
quite circumscribed. When inmates have attempted to file lethalinjection challenges many years before their scheduled executions,
those lawsuits typically have been dismissed as unripe on the theory
that the state’s procedures may change before the execution or that
198
the inmate might not be executed at all if his appeals succeed.
The Supreme Court has explained that the basic rationale of the
ripeness doctrine is to avoid “entangling [courts] in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies [and to] protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision
has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
199
challenging parties.” Forcing death row inmates to challenge their
states’ lethal-injection procedures years in advance, or risk not being
able to challenge them at all, creates just the kind of abstract
entanglement that the ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent. Or, as
Judge Gilman put it in his dissent in Cooey, “To require a petitioner
to file a § 1983 action three to five years before his or her execution in
order to obtain legal review of the lethal-injection protocol strikes me
200
as counterintuitive, unduly harsh, and just plain wrong.”
197. See supra text accompanying notes 183–87.
198. See Berger, supra note 10, at 294 (“Plaintiffs thus confront a catch-22: early claims can
be dismissed as unripe, later claims as dilatory.”).
199. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 161 (1987) (referring to Abbott Laboratories as containing
the “leading discussion” of the ripeness doctrine).
200. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 429 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting). Cooey and its progeny also seem not to have considered whether a plaintiff
challenging an execution protocol years in advance would even have standing to do so under
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As discussed in Part I, the lethal-injection challenges currently
201
being litigated do not simply challenge the protocols as written.
After the Supreme Court approved of Kentucky’s lethal-injection
202
procedures in Baze v. Rees, many states have simply adopted that
protocol on the theory that if it passed muster in Baze, it will pass
muster in their courts as well. But as several courts and commentators
have noted, what is written within the four corners of the protocol
203
does not end the constitutional inquiry. As Professor Eric Berger
has written, “Two execution procedures . . . can hardly be deemed
‘substantially similar’ merely because they use the same drugs. As
litigation has demonstrated, the procedure’s safety hinges on how the
204
drugs are administered.” Put another way, “The factual grounding
of Baze, and its specific review of Kentucky’s particular death-penalty
program, caution against applying unquestioningly its result to any
other case in which an inmate challenges a death-penalty protocol
205
that uses the same three drugs that Kentucky utilizes.”
Instead, the key questions relate to how the state presently
intends to administer the protocol. Who are the executioners? What
is their background and experience? How updated is the equipment
that will be used? How often have the executioners been trained?
Were the execution drugs obtained properly? Has the expiration date
on the drugs passed? A lethal-injection challenge is ripe when some
or all of these questions can be answered. But it makes little sense to
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the threat of future injury to him is “real and immediate.” Id. at 102. See generally Linda E.
Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of Injunctive Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1085 (1987) (discussing the implications of Lyons on cases seeking injunctive relief).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
202. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (plurality opinion).
203. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (evaluating the “extraprotocol elements” of Delaware’s execution protocol, which is, on paper, “identical” to the
Kentucky protocol reviewed in Baze); Thorson v. Epps, No. 4:08CV129-WAP-DAS, 2009 WL
1766806, at *1 (N.D. Miss. June 22, 2009) (asserting that an acknowledgement of the fact that
Mississippi’s protocol is “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s does not end the constitutional
inquiry under Baze); see also Berger, supra note 10, at 277 (“Given that the safety of a method
of execution depends not just on the four corners of the written protocol but on the details of
administration, a state’s procedure could not be deemed ‘substantially similar’ to Kentucky’s
without discovery into that state’s actual practices—the training and qualifications of its
execution team, the suitability of the equipment, the architecture of the execution facilities, and
so on.”).
204. Berger, supra note 10, at 277 (footnote omitted). Berger also notes that another
reading of the “substantially similar” language in Baze is that it refers only to the standard
needed to obtain a stay. See id. at 276 n.86.
205. Chester v. Beard, 657 F. Supp. 2d 534, 543 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
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even attempt to answer these questions several years before the
206
plaintiff will actually be executed.
2. Judicial Inefficiency. In addition to providing repose for
defendants, statutes of limitations are also said to be grounded in
207
solicitude for judicial economy. It is “awkward and wasteful for
judicial resources to be used to decide stale claims on stale
208
evidence.” Although the Cooey approach ostensibly seeks to avoid
delay and unnecessary judicial wrangling, setting the statute-oflimitations accrual date so early actually works against judicial
efficiency.
Even under the Cooey standard, if a state significantly changes
its written procedures between the initial lethal-injection challenge
and a plaintiff’s execution date, then the same plaintiff may be able to
209
file a second suit. In other words, the fact that lethal injection was in
place when an inmate lost on direct appeal ten years ago is irrelevant,
because the same lethal-injection procedure may not be used now.
This scenario is not merely hypothetical. For example, after the
botched execution attempt of Romell Broom, Ohio dramatically
changed its protocol—this time by eliminating two of the drugs in the
three-drug sequence and creating a backup plan, in the event of IV
access failure, that had never before been proposed for use in
210
executions. As Judge Gilman pointed out in Cooey, “No statutory

206. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1179 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(“I . . . cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that [plaintiff’s] cause of action began to accrue
five years before his execution date was set, during which time Alabama could, and in fact did,
amend its lethal injection protocol.”); Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 429 (6th Cir.
2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (“To require a petitioner to file a § 1983 action three to five years
before his or her execution in order to obtain legal review of the lethal-injection protocol strikes
me as counterintuitive, unduly harsh, and just plain wrong.”); Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (“[B]ecause the execution itself is the event [the plaintiff] claims
would violate his constitutional rights, it defies logic, and is contrary to the common law of torts,
to conclude that the statute of limitations has already run on a suit to prevent an
unconstitutional act that has not yet occurred.”).
207. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(“[One] policy [underlying statutes of limitations] is grounded in judicial economy . . . .”).
208. Id. (quoting Anthony v. Koppers Co., 425 A.2d 428, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)).
209. See, e.g., McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174 (holding that the statute of limitations begins
running on “the later of the date on which state review is complete, or the date on which the
capital litigant becomes subject to a new or substantially changed execution protocol”).
210. See Fields, supra note 187 (“In the backup procedure, workers will inject the lethal
drugs directly into a muscle—another practice that is not done anywhere else in the
country . . . .”); Urbina, supra note 37 (“Ohio [said] it would switch to a single drug, rather than
a three-drug cocktail, in its death penalty procedure.”).
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framework determines when or how such changes may occur.” Yet
presumably such drastic changes in procedures would restart the
statute-of-limitations clock for all death row inmates in Ohio,
regardless of whether they had already filed suit and had their
challenges dismissed for failure to comply with the statute of
212
limitations.
It is also concerning that the Cooey approach requires death row
inmates to file method-of-execution challenges so early in the
appellate and postconviction process. It is true that the prudent
prisoner today might, under some circumstances, file a lethalinjection challenge during, rather than at the completion of, his
federal habeas proceedings, to avoid dismissal of his lawsuit on
213
equitable grounds. Under Cooey, however, the challenge must be
filed within approximately two years of the completion of direct
214
review, when most death row inmates are at the very beginning of
their state postconviction proceedings and potentially decades away
from execution. Given the high rate of reversals in both state and
215
federal postconviction proceedings, it is likely that an inmate could
file a § 1983 action challenging lethal injection, win relief and a new
trial in state postconviction proceedings, get sentenced to death again
in a retrial, and then have to file another § 1983 challenge at the
conclusion of his second direct appeal process. In the meantime, the
lethal-injection procedures and personnel in the jurisdiction would
likely have changed in constitutionally meaningful ways.

211. Cooey II, 479 F.3d at 427 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
212. It is important to note, however, that although major changes to the written protocol—
such as the substitution of a three-drug protocol for a one-drug protocol—would likely restart
the statute-of-limitations clock under Cooey, courts have thus far interpreted narrowly the
exception in Cooey for changed procedures. In Cooey itself, the Sixth Circuit rejected the notion
that the 2006 changes made to the Ohio protocol following the botched execution of Joseph
Clark were sufficient to restart the clock, even though they addressed many fundamental
aspects of the execution procedures. Id. at 424. Subsequent district courts in Ohio have thus
been constrained, if somewhat reluctantly, to hold that the 2006 changes were not sufficiently
significant. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Strickland, No. 2:08-cv-442, 2008 WL 4115836, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 28, 2008) (noting that the court might be inclined to agree with the petitioner that the
statute of limitations should be restarted based on the 2006 changes but that “[i]t is not the
province of this Court to reject” the Sixth Circuit’s “notably sweeping conclusion” to the
contrary); see also Wilson v. Rees, No. 09-6306, 2010 WL 3450078, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2010)
(rejecting a Kentucky death row inmate’s claim that changes to the lethal-injection protocol in
that state restarted the statute-of-limitations clock under Cooey).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 165–67.
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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It was with an eye toward avoiding this wasteful and inefficient
litigation that the Supreme Court held in Stewart v. Martinez216
Villareal that a death row inmate’s claim of incompetency to be
217
executed is not ripe until his execution is imminent. There are other
parallels with Martinez-Villareal as well. Just as an inmate’s
competence can wax, wane, and deteriorate significantly during the
years between sentencing and execution, the administration of an
execution protocol can change substantially during the many years
from direct appeal to execution. Just as there can be times when the
condemned inmate is competent and times when he is not, there
could be periods when an execution process is constitutional and
218
periods when it is not.
219
In Panetti v. Quarterman, the Supreme Court elaborated on the
havoc it would wreak if death row inmates were required to raise
incompetency-to-be-executed claims well before their scheduled
executions:
“[T]he implications . . . would be far reaching and seemingly
perverse.” A prisoner would be faced with two options: forgo the
opportunity to raise a[n incompetency] claim in federal court; or
raise the claim in a first federal habeas application . . . even though it
is premature. . . . All prisoners are at risk of deteriorations in their
mental state. As a result, conscientious defense attorneys would be
obliged to file unripe (and, in many cases, meritless) [incompetency]
claims in each and every [habeas] application. This counterintuitive
approach would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants,
220
and the States, with no clear advantage to any.

Although the precise procedural considerations are somewhat
different in the method-of-execution context, the Court’s
apprehensions in Panetti are directly analogous. Given the concerns
one sees, particularly in the death penalty context, about judicial

216. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
217. Id. at 643.
218. For example, if a state is using recently expired drugs, or has obtained execution drugs
from an unauthorized source, its plan to implement the written protocol may be constitutionally
infirm. See supra text accompanying notes 47–53. This is not to say that it is impossible to
conceive of a lethal-injection challenge that is ripe several years prior to the scheduled
execution date. But again, the ripeness of the claim does not, and should not, dictate when it
accrues. See infra Part IV.
219. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
220. Id. at 943 (quoting Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 644).
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economy and discouraging frivolous litigation, it is counterintuitive
to set a rule that gives plaintiffs the incentive—and perhaps even the
mandate—to file method-of-execution challenges so early.
3. Fostering Uncertainty and Confusion. Another purpose of a
statute of limitations is the certainty it fosters, particularly for
222
defendants. The Cooey approach has the illusion of certainty, but
only that. It is true that the date upon which the inmate’s direct
review is completed is easily identifiable. Yet the Cooey approach
generally contains an exception for plaintiffs who did not have facts
about the state’s written protocol that were necessary to litigate their
223
claims. This could be a narrow loophole or an enormous one,
depending on how realistically courts view the nature of a lethalinjection challenge. Courts have thus far interpreted this loophole
quite narrowly, and, even on its face, it applies only to changes in the
224
written protocol. For the most part, courts have held that the state’s
choice of lethal injection as a method of execution (or perhaps the
release of the protocol) is sufficient to start the statute-of-limitations
225
clock running. But the reality is that protocols are ever-changing in
the current litigation climate, and it is likely that the same inmates’
accrual date will start over depending on how significantly a state
changes its lethal-injection protocol.
A challenge to lethal injection in Pennsylvania illustrates how
difficult it can be to determine when the statute of limitations should
accrue in situations in which it is unclear when the plaintiffs had
access to the information about the protocol needed to file a § 1983
226
lawsuit. In Chester v. Beard, the court agreed with the state that the
statute of limitations applied but concluded that there was no
221. See supra text accompanying note 83.
222. See Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 498 (2004) (“[I]t is . . . ‘unfair’ to disregard the principle of repose,
which provides defendants certainty that potential claims—whose adjudication may be
materially hampered by the passage of time—will expire on a date certain.”).
223. See supra text accompanying note 79.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 209–12.
225. See, e.g., Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[Section] 1983 method-ofexecution actions . . . necessarily accrue on the later of two dates: the date direct review of an
individual case is complete or the date on which the challenged protocol was adopted.”); Cooey
v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 422 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Ohio did not adopt lethal injection
until 1993, or make it the exclusive method of execution until 2001, so the accrual date must be
adjusted because Cooey obviously could not have discovered the ‘injury’ until one of those two
dates.”).
226. Chester v. Beard, 657 F. Supp. 2d 534 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
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immediately apparent accrual date that should serve to bar the
227
action. In that case, the state alleged that the plaintiffs had sufficient
information about the lethal-injection procedures as a result of a
letter that the state’s counsel had sent to counsel for the public
228
defender’s office some years earlier. The court held, however, that it
was impossible to determine which of the plaintiffs had seen the
letter, when they may have seen it, or whether the information in the
letter was sufficient to put them on notice of the potential
229
constitutional problems with the administration of the protocol.
Making matters worse, state officials “candidly acknowledged that
they carefully guard against public dissemination of information
regarding the Commonwealth’s death-penalty protocol, and this fact
230
makes it further difficult to determine an accrual date.”
Chester raises familiar and likely recurring problems in this
context. What if the protocol is made available to some inmates under
231
seal, but is not available at all to other inmates? What if the
protocol is adopted but kept a secret? What if the protocol is released
publicly, but the details—such as the qualifications of the personnel
232
tasked with administering the protocol—are not? These questions
demonstrate that there is nothing certain about the Cooey approach
to an accrual date. This uncertainty undermines the central principle
of repose, a principle “which provides defendants certainty that
potential claims—whose adjudication may be materially hampered by
233
the passage of time—will expire on a date certain.”
227. Id. at 540–41.
228. Id. at 538–39.
229. Id. at 540–41 n.4.
230. Id. at 541.
231. It is not uncommon for the details of a state’s lethal-injection protocol to be made
available only to counsel for death row inmates who are parties to pending litigation. See, e.g.,
Pamela Manson, Killer to Get Info on Execution Means, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 6, 2010, at B1
(noting a court’s decision to allow counsel for Utah death row inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner
access to information about Utah’s execution methods on the condition that counsel would not
“show the documents to [Gardner] or other inmates”). In some cases, such as litigation
currently pending regarding the federal government’s lethal-injection procedures, all of the
relevant documents are under seal, and only six federal death row inmates are party to the
litigation and therefore privy to the information.
232. See Berger, supra note 10, at 277 (noting “states’ efforts to conceal the details” of their
lethal-injection procedures). It has been a battle for death row inmates in many states to learn
the qualifications of the execution team members who will be implementing the written
protocol. See, e.g., Emergency Motion for Stay of Execution Under Circuit Rule 27-3, Brown v.
Vail, No. 10-35771 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010) (describing the efforts of petitioner’s counsel to
obtain information about the qualifications of execution team members in Washington).
233. Bain & Colella, supra note 222, at 498.
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Parts II and III of this Article have demonstrated that, when
equitable concerns are conflated with statute-of-limitations concerns,
the result is an arbitrary and unfair rule that does not achieve its
intended purpose. The question remains: is there a better way?
Where should the accrual date be set if not at some point along the
appellate timeline? Part IV suggests that the question itself wrongly
assumes a predicate that may not exist; specifically, when the
constitutional injury has not yet occurred, there ought not be any
accrual date prior to the execution itself.
IV. NO FUNCTIONAL ACCRUAL DATE
There is a reason why any attempt to choose an accrual date
prior to the execution has an air of arbitrariness to it. Courts that do
so are trying to fix a date at which point a tort has been committed,
when the injury has not yet—and, indeed, may never—occur. This is
why the best approach is the one Judge Thompson proposed in Jones:
the accrual date, if it ever occurs, occurs on the date of the
234
unconstitutional execution. Because the execution results in the
prospective plaintiff’s death, there is no functional accrual date under
this approach.
235
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Judge Thompson
pointed out that “the statute [of limitations] does not usually begin to
236
run until the tort is complete.” In method-of-execution challenges,
the tort is not complete until the plaintiff is executed. Thus, the
statute-of-limitations clock should not start until the execution has
occurred. Moreover, as discussed previously, the historical and policy
reasons behind the statute-of-limitations defense, if anything, support
an accrual date that coincides with the execution itself. In general,
“the farther away in time from the tortious act, the staler the claim
and the greater the defendants’ interest in a statute of limitations
237
barring it.” It thus defies common sense, as Judge Thompson

234. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148 (M.D. Ala. 2007). Judge Thompson is not the
only one to suggest this approach. The district court judge in Cooey did so as well. See Cooey v.
Strickland (Cooey I), No. 2:04 CV 1156, 2005 WL 5253337, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2005).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
236. Jones, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. c) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. Id. at 1150.
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explained, to urge that “the statute of limitations take effect as we
238
move closer in time to the complained-of act.”
Consider, for example, a § 1983 lawsuit filed by the family of an
executed prisoner for the pain and suffering he experienced as a
result of a botched execution. The natural accrual date for such an
action would be the date of the botched execution, and not a moment
before. Indeed, when the family of Joseph Clark initiated such an
action in Ohio soon after Clark’s botched execution, the statute of
limitations was never even raised as a defense by the lawyers in the
239
Ohio Attorney General’s Office who defended against the suit.
Yet in the lethal-injection context, states’ lawyers now routinely
cite the adoption by Cooey and its progeny of an approach that bars
claims long before the violation even occurs, let alone grows stale.
The primary justification for the circuit courts’ rejection of Judge
Thompson’s approach is that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
240
241
Wallace v. Kato precludes a no-accrual-date standard.
In Wallace, the petitioner had filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the
City of Chicago and several Chicago police officers seeking damages
for an unlawful arrest and false imprisonment that had led to his
242
wrongful conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. The
question for the Court was when the § 1983 statute of limitations
243
accrued. The Court noted that, typically, accrual occurs when the
plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the
244
plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” When the tort at issue is
false imprisonment, however, the Court noted that there has to be
some accommodation for the fact that the “victim may not be able to
245
sue while he is still imprisoned.” Thus, the Court pinned the accrual
date to the date upon which the false imprisonment ended—that is,
246
when legal process was initiated.
Cooey and its progeny rely to a great extent on Wallace to rule
out an accrual date that coincides with the execution. These courts
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Clark v. Voorhies, No. 1:07-cv-00510 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2010).
240. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
241. See, e.g., Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing
accrual under principles “the Supreme Court recently made clear” in Wallace).
242. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 386–87.
243. Id. at 387.
244. Id. at 388 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Id. at 389.
246. Id. at 390.
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point to the language in Wallace to the effect that accrual occurs when
247
the plaintiff “can file suit and obtain relief.” As the Eleventh Circuit
put it in McNair, “it is difficult to reconcile Wallace with the [lower
court’s] holding that the limitations period would not begin to run
248
until after the litigant has died.” The theory of these courts is that,
pursuant to the language of Wallace, a death row inmate could file
suit (as several have) and obtain relief prior to the execution itself.
So, it cannot be that the claim has not yet accrued.
But Wallace does not inexorably lead to the conclusion in Cooey.
As Judge Thompson explained in Jones, Wallace was, in many ways, a
typical § 1983 suit in which the plaintiff filed suit after the tort had
249
occurred. Because the method-of-execution challenge seeks to
prevent an allegedly unconstitutional act from occurring in the future,
the language in Wallace that Cooey and its progeny rely upon is of
250
limited significance. Judge Thompson went on to say, however, that
Wallace should not be ignored. In fact, Wallace teaches that “[a]spects
of § 1983 [that] are not governed by reference to state law are
governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law tort
principles,” and that those principles provide that the statute of
251
limitations does not begin to run until the tort is “complete.”
Judge Thompson was right. But Wallace supports the no-accrualdate approach even more than he acknowledges. First, Wallace
discusses the “standard rule” for determining the accrual date but
explicitly states that there is a “refinement to be considered” when
252
the tort at issue is “distinctive.” In other words, the general
approach cited talismanically by the Cooey line of cases—that accrual
occurs when the plaintiff can “file suit and obtain relief”—is just that:
a general rule, subject to refinement and exception when the tort
involved is not a typical tort.
Even more importantly, Wallace also demonstrates that nothing
prevents a plaintiff from suing before a claim accrues for statute-oflimitations purposes. Such an event struck both the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits as an impossibility, and this was the basis for their
247. See, e.g., McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Wallace, 549
U.S. at 388); Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Roane v.
Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216, 221 (D.D.C. 2009) (same).
248. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1174.
249. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
250. Id. at 1147–48.
251. Id. at 1148.
252. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.
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objection to the no-accrual-date approach. In McNair, the Eleventh
Circuit indicated that it believed that setting the accrual date at the
completion of direct review precluded a lawsuit from being filed
253
earlier. In Cooey, the Sixth Circuit rejected the suggestion to set the
accrual date at the point where actual harm is inflicted “because the
death-sentenced inmate’s claim would not accrue until he was
254
executed, at which time it would also be simultaneously moot.”
These courts are confusing ripeness with accrual. As Wallace actually
clarifies, a claim can be ripe without having accrued. Wallace
explicitly recognized that the plaintiff in that case could have sued
255
before his statute of limitations accrued.
The distinction between ripeness and accrual is important not
only because it calls into question the fundamental underpinning of
the Cooey court’s discomfort with the no-accrual-date approach, but
also because it highlights the fallacy of any accrual date that is tied to
an inmate’s appeal or postconviction proceedings. Even the approach
favored by the dissenters, which would set the accrual date at the
completion
of
federal
habeas
proceedings,
betrays
a
misunderstanding of the distinction between ripeness and accrual.
After all, it may be risky for any death row inmate to wait until the
completion of federal habeas proceedings to file a claim, even if the
governing law in his jurisdiction stated that his claim did not accrue
256
until that point in time. Yet the approach of the dissenters implies
that inmates must wait until federal habeas proceedings are over
before filing suit.
A method-of-execution challenge is ripe when the prospective
plaintiff has all of the facts necessary to file a claim. That is, when the
257
plaintiff can file suit. The selection of an accrual date should address
the purposes of statutes of limitations. That is, when the plaintiff must
file suit. Method-of-execution challenges are analogous to
“continuing violation” cases in which an unlawful practice continues
253. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1176; see also Roane v. Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216, 221–22
(D.D.C. 2009) (implying that a challenge cannot be filed prior to the accrual date set by the
court).
254. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 418 (6th Cir. 2007).
255. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390 n.3 (“This is not to say, of course, that petitioner could not
have filed suit immediately upon his false arrest.”).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 165–67.
257. See, e.g., David Floren, Comment, Pre-Enforcement Ripeness Doctrine: The Fitness of
Hardship, 80 OR. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2001) (“For issues raised in the controversy to be fit for
resolution by the court, they should be largely legal in nature and should not require further
factual development.”).
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258

into the limitations period. In those cases, the Supreme Court has
said, “the staleness concern disappears,” and the statute of limitations
begins running only when the “last asserted occurrence” of the
259
allegedly illegal practice takes place. In a method-of-execution
challenge, the “last asserted occurrence” of the continuing violation is
the execution itself. The Cooey approach is wrong not only because
the analogy to AEDPA is faulty, but also because any attempt to tie
accrual to what is essentially an unrelated proceeding—the appeals
and postconviction process—divorces the inquiry from the principles
that underlie statutes of limitations.
The no-accrual-date approach is not perfect. For example,
because it allows method-of-execution challenges to be brought
whenever new relevant facts come to light, it does not guarantee the
certainty that is one of the purposes of statutes of limitations. The
response to this concern is twofold. First, the Cooey approach also
fosters little certainty, and it may be that so long as method-ofexecution claims are cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, it is
impossible to draw clear, bright lines with respect to when claims can
260
and cannot be brought. Second, there should be little worry that the
no-accrual-date approach will open the doors to a flood of last-minute
method-of-execution claims, or that such an approach will stifle
innovation in the development of execution procedures. After all,
prior to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Cooey in 2007, the statute of
limitations was never an issue in these cases, and the courts proved
themselves quite capable of distinguishing meritorious and timely
filed claims from frivolous and dilatory ones.
Another potential argument against the no-accrual-date
approach, not yet articulated by any court, is that the tort being
committed is not the execution itself, but the imposition of the risk
that the tort will be committed. In Baze, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that “[o]ur cases recognize that subjecting individuals
to a risk of future harm—not simply actually inflicting pain—can
261
262
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.” Helling v. McKinney
258. See supra text accompanying note 155.
259. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 (1981). Method-of-execution
challenges may also be loosely analogized to the tort claim of medical monitoring, which has
also raised vexing procedural issues, including ones related to statute-of-limitations accrual.
Pankaj Venugopal, Note, The Class Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1659, 1675–76 (2002).
260. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
261. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530 (2008) (plurality opinion).

ALPER IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

1/5/2011 5:04:31 PM

BLIND DATES

915

263

and Farmer v. Brennan explain what level of risk qualifies to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation, but neither case addressed
the question of when a lawsuit filed under the Eighth Amendment
264
would accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes. One might argue,
however, that if the risk is the constitutional violation, why not set the
accrual date at the point where the risk rises to the level of a
constitutional violation?
The answer is that, although Helling and Farmer explain that an
Eighth Amendment violation can be proven by establishing the level
of risk, it is not the risk itself that constitutes the tort—only the
torturous execution can actually inflict constitutional injury upon the
plaintiff. Judge Thompson wrote in Jones that “[k]nowledge of a
needless risk of a painful death at the hands of the State does not
265
itself violate the Constitution; only the execution itself would.” Can
that language be squared with the language in Baze suggesting that
subjecting individuals to the risk of pain “can qualify as cruel and
266
unusual punishment”? Yes, if one understands that the showing of
risk in these contexts is necessary because the case involves a future
267
harm; the litigation aims to prevent the harm from happening, so
the risk is a stand-in for the actual injury. In other words, the claim is
ripe when the plaintiff can show the substantial risk, but it does not
268
accrue until the harm is actually inflicted.
Moreover, an approach to accrual that started the statute-oflimitations clock at the point at which the risk became “substantial”
would lead to a hopelessly confusing and inefficient set of
considerations. Courts would have to engage in bizarre mental
gymnastics to determine not whether the state’s procedures violated
262. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
263. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
264. In a footnote, the Farmer Court stated, “At what point a risk of inmate assault becomes
sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes is a question this case does not present,
and we do not address it.” Id. at 834 n.3.
265. Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007).
266. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530.
267. See Helling, 509 U.S. at 33 (“That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm
to inmates is not a novel proposition.”).
268. It is also important to point out that the statute of limitations was not before the Court
in Baze. In fact, the Court’s language was intended to deal with a very different problem: the
ability of a death row inmate to sue prior to the infliction of the harm. In other words, the Court
was implicitly addressing the ripeness issue, assuring plaintiffs that its precedent did not
preclude a civil lawsuit to enjoin a future harm. Nothing in the Baze decision can otherwise be
read to suggest that the Court believed a method-of-execution claim accrued at the moment the
harm became substantial enough to justify a constitutional intervention.
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the Baze standard, but, as a threshold matter, when exactly (to the
day) the risk of harm crossed the line into “substantial” territory such
that the statute of limitations began running. The impossibility of
such a task may explain why no court has suggested such an
approach.
Because the event the litigation seeks to avoid—the torturous
execution—is an event with a fixed time, it is easier and more sensible
to attach accrual there. This approach is the best answer doctrinally
and also avoids the arbitrary and confusing line drawing of Cooey. It
is also more faithful to the principles of statutes of limitations than is
the approach championed by the Cooey dissenters. It provides a
realistic opportunity for a day in court for death row inmates with
meritorious claims, and, more than any other approach, it takes into
account the realities of most method-of-execution challenges filed in
today’s capital punishment regime.
CONCLUSION
One does not have to guess at the motivations behind Cooey and
its progeny. The Eleventh Circuit in McNair worried about giving
death row inmates “veto power” over the state’s ability to enforce its
269
judgments. The Sixth Circuit in Cooey was concerned about
weakening the states’ ability to “exercise [their] sovereign power and
270
to finalize [their] judgments.” It is a familiar concern: that death row
inmates and their attorneys are forever cooking up novel challenges
271
to delay the inevitable. But what makes the Cooey approach truly
puzzling is that it is simply not necessary in order to address the
stated concern about dilatory lawsuits, and the havoc the Cooey
approach wreaks on the doctrine is not insubstantial.
As this Article demonstrates, courts’ equitable power to
determine whether a stay is appropriate is more than sufficient to
weed out method-of-execution lawsuits that are deemed to be
dilatory. Whatever one thinks of the appropriate accrual date in this
context, the use of the statute of limitations to punish death row
inmates for filing late § 1983 lawsuits has spawned a rule that has no
upside. It does not provide certainty, it does not provide access to the
courts to those who are legitimately entitled, and it bears little

269. See discussion supra Part III.A.
270. Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412, 419 (6th Cir. 2007).
271. See supra note 83.
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resemblance to the historical justifications for statutes of limitations.
Yet it is currently the law of the land in the most active death penalty
states.
In McNair, the Eleventh Circuit listed three benefits of using
272
AEDPA’s statute of limitations in the method-of-execution context.
This Article has rejected the first two—to preclude claims from being
273
274
filed too early or too late —as plausible bases for adopting the
AEDPA statute of limitations. The court suggested a third, additional
benefit: that, by mirroring the AEDPA statute of limitations, the
method-of-execution statute of limitations “thereby simplif[ies] the
postconviction labyrinth of filing deadlines through which capital
275
litigants must navigate.” This view is either naïve or deliberately
disingenuous. Nothing about the Cooey approach simplifies filing
deadlines for death row inmates.
To the contrary, the Cooey approach renders it virtually
impossible for many death row inmates to pursue litigation
challenging the method of execution. As one Sixth Circuit judge
noted, “Determining when the statute of limitations begins to run for
a death-sentenced prisoner who wishes to challenge a state’s method
of execution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is tantamount to determining
whether the prisoner will be able to challenge the method of
276
execution at all.”
Recent challenges to lethal-injection procedures have exposed
grave problems with the administration of that particular method of
277
execution in many states. This litigation has delayed a number of
executions, but it has also resulted in more humane executions in
278
some states and at least a continued judicial vigilance in many
279
others. The no-accrual-date approach advocated here acknowledges
272. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1176–77 (11th Cir. 2008).
273. See supra Part III.B.1.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 160–80.
275. McNair, 515 F.3d at 1177.
276. Getsy v. Strickland (Getsy II), 577 F.3d 320, 321 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
277. See Denno, supra note 31, at 107–15 (discussing recent lethal-injection procedure
challenges in California, Missouri, North Carolina, Florida, and Tennessee).
278. See Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio: 1 Lethal Injection Drug Should End Lawsuit,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010275931_
apusdeathpenaltyohio.html (“Opponents of the three-drug system [are] . . . applauding Ohio for
taking a step that other states have considered but not undertaken.”).
279. See Dieter, supra note 25, at 806–08 (describing recent lethal-injection procedure
challenges and the resulting vigilance of courts).
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that the injury is a torturous execution, and that if the statute of
limitations should run at all in such a case, it should run from the day
the harm is inflicted. Successful inmates will file their lawsuits long
before that moment, when their claims ripen. Inmates like Romell
Broom in Ohio will be able to get their day in court and prevent the
infliction of serious constitutional injury before it occurs.
Cooey and its progeny represent a series of court decisions that
distort settled doctrine to solve a problem that does not exist. It is not
immediately clear what that phenomenon tells us about courts and
their treatment of issues that are at the intersection of criminal and
civil law. What is clear is that courts wrestling with the proper accrual
date for a method-of-execution challenge would do well to reconsider
the Cooey approach in favor of one that is more faithful to the
purposes of statutes of limitations, more practical, and no less
consistent with a desire to preclude dilatory lawsuits.

